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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze and examine the differences in the 
preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing 
their self-reported perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-
mitigating practices. Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were 
aligned with the five components of information systems: hardware, software, data, procedures 
and people. The study examined the perceptions of security threats associated with these factors 
and explored the perceptions of the effectiveness of critical measures with respect to these 
factors within the constraints applicable to educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of 
the threats to information security, this study further explored mechanisms and frequencies with 
which the different types of educational institutions conduct key security practices and stay up-
to-date in their information security policies and procedures. The population of interest for this 
study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of the following types of educational 
institutions in the state of Florida: public and private PK-12 institutions, public and private 
universities, and virtual schools. At every stage of this explorative study, comparative analyses 
were conducted. The researcher found no statistically significant differences between the types 
of educational institutions in their perceptions of security risks. However, in terms of their 
perceptions of the effectiveness of security measures, frequencies of key security practices and 
policy updates, budget allocations, and overall assessment of security preparedness, the 
educational institutions showed statistically significant differences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background of Study 
As businesses, educational institutions and individuals rely more and more on technology 
for operational and decision-support activities, the importance of cyber-security cannot be over 
stated. This is because as technological advances happen, so do the advances in sophistication of 
cyber-crimes. Data breaches costing millions of dollars happen every year (Gardner & Thomas, 
2014). Different breach tracking sources report different data breach numbers, but they all 
unanimously report that breaches in educational institutions remain high. In fact, according to the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data Breaches report that tracks all reported data 
breaches starting from 2005, almost 25 million user records have been breached in educational 
institutions. In between 2005 and April 2018, there have been 815 reported data breaches in 
educational institutions (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). In the 2017 and 2018 editions of 
the annual data breach investigations report published by Verizon Enterprises, a total of 747 
incidents were identified in educational institutions in 2016 and 2017 alone, 174 with confirmed 
data disclosure (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017/2018).  
Educational institutions often store a significant amount of private information, including 
educational and health records, and identity information of all personnel involved which may 
include students, teachers, faculty, administrators and staff (Levy & Ramim, 2016). 
Unfortunately, the security measures adopted by educational institutions are often not up to the 
standards desired in the world of information systems (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, Son, & Benbasat, 
2015). Analyses of cyber-security often reveal that educational institutions do not adequately 
address the cyber-security issues by having appropriate plans in place. Further, such analyses 
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also reveal that information security is often not considered a key requirement in many 
educational institutions. Consequently, the volume of data breaches affecting educational 
institutions has grown (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014).  
A data breach is defined as an incident in which an individual’s identifying information 
which may include a social security number, driver’s license number, medical record or financial 
record (credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of exposure. These breaches 
result in identity theft, privacy violations and fraud (Data Breaches, 2018). Educational 
institutions are in a unique position as compared to their industry counterparts as their user-bases 
have been primarily comprised of children and young adults whose identity information once 
compromised may not be misused instantly, but rather years later when they move to the 
workforce. As such, a detection of a breach is more challenging (Farina, 2015). In addition, the 
educational institutions are subject to different federal and state statutes that regulate data 
privacy such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act [FERPA], The Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards [PCI-DSS], Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [GLBA], Red Flags 
Rule, The Federal Information Security Management Act [FISMA], and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Further, 
they can be subject to class action lawsuits in the wake of a data breach (IT Security for Higher 
Education: A Legal Perspective, 2003). Finally, significant costs, both tangible and intangible are 
incurred by an affected institution whenever a breach happens (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). In an 
era where budget shortage in the field of education is a recurring phenomenon, any significant 
un-budgeted costs can prove to be devastating for affected institutions (Mitchell, Palacios, & 
Leachman, 2014).  
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Statement of the Problem 
The problem that was investigated in this study was the level of preparedness of 
educational institutions to ensure the security of their information. The threats to data and 
information security are constantly evolving, and becoming increasingly sophisticated with time 
(Vacca, 2012). Interestingly, educational institutions have endured a significant number of data 
breaches in recent times. In fact, almost 25 million user records have been breached in 
educational institutions between 2005 and April 2018 (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). The 
cost incurred by an educational institution in the event of a data breach has increased. It was 
$260 per record breached in 2017 with a four-year average of $200 per record (Cost of Data 
Breach Study, 2017). Historically, there has been a reluctance on the part of educational 
institutions to designate information security as a top-most priority, often due to cultural and 
budgetary reasons. As such, information security practices and procedures followed in these 
institutions have often been inadequate in countering the threat of sophisticated data breaches 
(Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Consequently, they are the victims in a very high 
proportion of reported data breaches. Although extensive research exists in identifying and 
quantifying security threats that apply universally to all kinds of institutions, there have been few 
studies focused on preparedness of educational institutions in combating such threats and 
identifying areas where they are the most vulnerable.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze the preparedness of educational 
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported 
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices. 
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Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were aligned with the five 
components of any information system: hardware, software, data, procedures, and people 
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). The researcher examined the security threats associated with these 
factors and explored the critical measures with respect to these factors that can enhance security 
within the constraints applicable to educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the 
threats to information security, this study was also conducted to further explore the frequencies 
with which the different types of educational institutions undertake critical security practices and 
stay up-to-date in their information security policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of 
educational institutions, with respect to implementing information security measures as reflected 
in their allocation of budgets for the same, was explored. Obtaining this information could 
potentially allow for educational leaders to formulate and enforce policies and practices that will 
enhance their preparedness in securing their institutional data. At every stage of this explorative 
study, comparative analyses were made about the level of preparedness among different types of 
educational institutions with respect to their information security related measures.  
Significance of the Study 
The landscape of information security in educational institutions is changing rapidly. The 
concept of a lone hacker creating viruses in a basement has been relegated to the background 
(Zalaznick, 2013). Instead, data breaches conducted by sophisticated foreign governments as 
cyber espionage are the top cybersecurity threat today (Data Breach Investigations Report, 
2017). Today’s hackers are now being deployed around the clock to steal intellectual property, 
sensitive research, and personal information, potentially costing educational institutions millions 
of dollars and badly damaging their reputations (Thompson, 2015). These institutions are 
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susceptible to numerous kinds of data breaches due to the open welcoming environment in which 
they operate and the vast amount of data they compile from students, teachers, faculty, 
employees, and other affiliated individuals. Thus, they need to balance the security of their 
information systems with their focus on the uninterrupted flow of information (Amigud, Arnedo-
Moreno, Daradoumis, & Geurrero-Roldan, 2018). This exploratory study was intended to 
provide leaders in educational institutions with relevant information relating to the self-reported 
preparedness of institutions to tackle the ever-increasing threats to their data. This study may 
assist in providing the decision makers with information relating to certain key areas where they 
need to focus to optimize the conflicting requirements of security and convenience. This study 
may also assist the decision makers with information on how to handle a post-breach situation 
with respect to the various legal implications involved. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this explorative study, the following operational definitions were 
used for key terms that pertain directly to the research being conducted.  
Any information system is comprised of five components. Those are hardware, 
software, data, procedure and people (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). At least one or all the five 
components are typically involved in a data breach. 
Hardware - Hardware is the part of an information system that can be touched – the 
physical components of the technology. Computers, keyboards, disk drives, iPads, and flash 
drives are all examples of information systems hardware (Bourgeois, 2014).  
Software - Software is a set of instructions that tells the hardware what to do. Software is 
not tangible – it cannot be touched. When programmers create software programs, what they are 
 6 
really doing is simply typing out lists of instructions that tell the hardware what to do. There are 
several categories of software, with the two main categories being operating-system software, 
which makes the hardware usable, and application software, which does something useful. 
Examples of operating systems include Microsoft Windows on a personal computer and 
Google’s Android on a mobile phone. Examples of application software are Microsoft Excel and 
Google Drive (Bourgeois, 2014).  
Data - Data are comprised of a collection of facts. For example, street address, the city 
where one lives in, and phone number are all pieces of data. Like software, data are also 
intangible. By themselves, pieces of data are not really very useful. But aggregated, indexed, and 
organized together often into a database, data can become a powerful tool for decision-making 
purposes. Institutions collect all kinds of data and use it to make decisions (Bourgeois, 2014). 
One of the most critical pieces of data that are stored by an institution are personally identifiable 
information (PII) of its constituent individuals and entities. PII may include social security 
numbers, tax identification numbers and similar unique identifiers. This is the data component 
that is most routinely targeted by perpetrators (Levy & Ramim, 2016).  
Procedure - A procedure is a series of steps undertaken to achieve a desired outcome or 
goal (Stair & Reynolds, 2013). 
People – People are the creators, operators and consumers of an information system. 
People buy hardware, code software, analyze data, design procedures and finally make decisions. 
An information system cannot function without the involvement of people. From programming 
to data entry to the final decision making, people are involved (Stair & Reynolds, 2013). 
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There are essentially four components involved in any data breach situation applicable to 
educational institutions. Those are threat, vulnerability, safeguard and target (Kroenke & Boyle, 
2015).   
Threat - A threat is an entity that attempts to obtain and manipulate information systems 
data via illegal and secretive means (Jouini, Rabai, & Aissa, 2014).  
Vulnerability - A vulnerability is the opportunity that a threat may utilize to accomplish 
its objectives (Austin, Holmgreen, & Williams, 2013).  
Safeguard - A safeguard is the shield that blocks a threat from accomplishing its motives 
(Fay & Patterson, 2018). 
Target - A target is what is being coveted by the threat (Fay & Patterson, 2018).  
These four components work together in the event of a data breach. For a data breach to 
happen, a threat uses one or more vulnerabilities to bypass installed safeguards to reach the 
target. In an educational institution, targets typically comprise user identity information. 
Examples of threats include hacking, phishing, malware and ransomware that may exploit 
vulnerabilities like weak passwords, user ignorance and insecure systems. These may be 
prevented by adequate safeguards like firewalls, encrypted data, strong passwords and proper 
training (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015).  
Figure 1 shows a threat/loss scenario which illustrates the inter-play of threats, 
vulnerabilities, safeguards and targets. 
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Figure 1. Threat/loss scenario 
Source: Kroenke, D., & Boyle, R. (2015). Experiencing MIS. Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson 
 
 
Research Questions 
To analyze the preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of 
their data by comparing their assessments of security risks and their corresponding risk-
mitigating practices, the following three research questions were created. The questions were 
sequentially placed as they relate to institutions’ recognition, influence, and application of factors 
and their indication of the same in the research instrument used for this study.  
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among 
educational institutions with respect to identification and classification of threats, and 
how do results vary across the types of institutions?  
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five factors of 
information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): 
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1.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for software-
oriented threats among the different types of educational institutions? 
1.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for data-
oriented threats among the different types of educational institutions? 
1.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for people-
oriented threats among the different types of educational institutions? 
2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among 
educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, frequency of critical 
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation, and how do results 
vary across the types of institutions? 
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five factors of 
information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical measures and 
security policy updates, and budgetary allocation: 
2.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
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2.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
software-oriented security measures among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of data-
oriented security measures among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
people-oriented security measures among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2.6 What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of high-
frequency critical practices among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2.7. What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of low-
frequency critical practices and security policy updates among the different 
types of educational institutions? 
2.8. What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to information 
security among the different types of educational institutions? 
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3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational institutions 
with respect to information security, and how do results vary across the types of 
institutions? 
Review of Extant Literature 
This analysis focusses on the level of preparedness of educational institutions to ensure 
the security of their data. Much research has been done within the field of identifying the threats 
to information security; however, there is dearth of research pertaining to the self-reported 
preparedness of educational institutions to handle information security threats.  
Latest published literature and investigation reports often identify the frequencies, threats, 
motives and the types of data that are compromised during security breaches in educational 
institutions and compare them to the full picture of all areas and types of industries. For example, 
75% of all reported beaches across all industries were conducted by outsiders and only 25% 
involved insiders. In contrast, 30% of insiders were involved in all reported breaches in 
educational institutions. Reports have also shown the changing distribution of threats in 
educational institutions. In 2016, Cyber-espionage was present in 26% of breaches, with User 
Errors closely behind at 22%. The previous year, the Cyber-espionage pattern accounted for only 
5% of breaches while Web Application Attacks were the dominant threat. The trend in increased 
espionage breaches can be possibly attributed to access to research studies across a variety of 
disciplines conducted at universities. These studies are often coveted by state-affiliated groups. 
The breach findings have further shown that over half of the incidents in educational institutions 
involved the compromise and disclosure of stored personal information of both students and 
employees, with a little over 25% resulting in the disclosure of intellectual property. Educational 
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institutions face numerous challenges that are unique when it comes to keeping sensitive 
information secure. A significant challenge is often the prevalent inclusive culture based on the 
free and open exchange of ideas and information. The profile of the student/user population 
whose varying degrees of technical skills and curiosity must be considered, not to mention their 
roles as data subjects, whose personally identifiable information (PII) and other information must 
be protected (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017). 
Research and findings have often suggested that compromised identifying information of 
students is often not used immediately for financial transactions, keeping in mind the low-
income status of the student stage. Only when they have an established career do perpetrators 
attempt identity-theft related activities. Thus, there is often a significant time lag between 
compromise of information and its subsequent detection. This feature is often unique to 
educational institutions (Farina, 2015). 
The significantly high number of breaches occurring due to user errors (22%), notably 
mis-delivery of sensitive data and publishing errors as seen in educational institutions in 2016 
further suggest the lack of adequate training and preparation of support staff as compared to their 
counterparts in the private industry (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017). Compounding the 
problem is the often the lack of budgetary support for information security prevalent in 
educational institutions (Powerhouses and Benchwarmers, 2014). Furthermore, there are often 
differences among the type of educational institutions with respect to their security policies, 
technical expertise, content management, infrastructure, and budget allocations which makes 
difficult the process of generalizing the picture applicable to all educational institutions (Hentea, 
2005). 
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These findings indicate that the cyber security landscape is changing. In fact, it is 
changing very fast. The question is whether educational institutions are acknowledging the 
threats and preparing themselves to handle them. Implementing security controls with reduced 
budgets and training opportunities while still maintaining the culture of openness is, thus, a 
balancing act that educational institution leaders have to endure. This exploratory study was 
aimed at ascertaining educational institutions’ preparedness and how their preparations differed 
based on types of educational institutions. 
Methodology 
Only after receiving the approval of the University of Central Florida’s Institutional 
Review Board (Appendix A), was research for this study initiated. The data for this study were 
collected using an instrument created by the researcher specifically for this study. This 
questionnaire-based instrument was used to measure the preparedness of educational institutions 
to ensure the security of their institutional information. The questionnaire primarily focused on 
four institution-specific areas that reflected their preparedness to counter security threats. Those 
are threat identification, threat mitigation practices, frequency of key security practices and 
updates of established security policies and practices, and budgetary allocations to enable 
security measures. The questions pertaining to these areas were further classified according to 
the five components of information systems – hardware, software, data, people, and procedures 
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Responses to the questionnaire were obtained from five different 
types of educational institutions namely PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools, PK-12 
Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private Colleges/Universities in the state of 
Florida. Thereafter, the responses were aggregated based on the type of institution. Comparative 
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analyses using statistical tools such as the ANOVA and correlation analysis were performed on 
the data obtained from the different types of educational institutions. 
Population 
The population of interest for this study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of 
the following types of educational institutions in the state of Florida: PK-12 Public Schools, PK-
12 Private Schools, PK-12 Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private 
Colleges/Universities. Because the threat to institutional data applies to all educational 
institutions, a representation of different types of educational institutions was necessary for an 
accurate analysis as they are subjected to different levels of constraints with respect to ensuring 
information security.  
Instrumentation 
The Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), created by the author for this 
study, was used to measure the preparedness of the educational institutions to combat 
information security threats. The ISPI©, shown in Appendix B, includes sections which were 
used to answer the research questions which guided this study. A draft version of the ISPI© was 
created first with relevant questions aimed at answering the study’s research questions. 
Thereafter, it was reviewed by an expert panel and necessary revisions were made. A cognitive 
laboratory approach (Jobe, 1990) was then used to gauge comprehension and assess the cognitive 
burden placed on respondents. Finally, the instrument was checked for reliability using 
Chronbach’s alpha (Gliem & Gliem, 2003) (see Appendix C).  
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Procedures 
In March 2018, the chief information officers or their equivalent in selected educational 
institutions in Florida were sent an email requesting them to complete the online ISPI©. A 
hyperlink was provided in the email for the respondents to click and begin completing the 
instrument. Prior to beginning the instrument, the respondents were asked for their consent to 
take part in this study (Appendix D). They had to agree to participate in the ISPI© instrument 
before they were able to begin. Once they were in the online instrument, the respondents were 
asked to read each item carefully and select the option(s) that most closely resembled their self-
perception and experience related to information security in their respective institutions. 
The respondents were reminded in the informed consent that participating in this study 
was voluntary and that they had the option to change their minds and stop at any time. They also 
had the option to not answer any ISPI© instrument item for any reason and to withdraw at any 
time.  The ISPI© instrument was open for 24 days. To facilitate a high response rate, follow-up 
e-mail messages were sent prior to the closing of the ISPI© instrument. 
Analysis of Data 
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale 
of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. The data hereby obtained for the threats were 
aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data, 
people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items within each of 
the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were grouped together 
(i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles 
 16 
for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of 
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at 
the type of institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to 
compare threat perceptions across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent 
variables were the threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems 
(hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the 
institution type.  
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention 
measures on a scale of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to 
indicate on the ISPI© instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions 
reviewed and updated their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining 
the institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to 
prevent breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about 
their institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds and the reporting lines 
of the head of information technology for this purpose. The data obtained for the threat 
prevention measures were aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems: 
hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for 
individual items within each of the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar 
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by 
institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of 
the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response 
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profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at the type of institution level. Five separate one-way 
ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat prevention measures across the different 
types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures 
aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, 
people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the institution type.  The responses 
about frequencies of key security measures and security policy updates were analyzed using 
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. Two 
separate ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare the frequencies of key security 
measures across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the 
frequencies of key security measures and the independent variable was the institution type. 
Finally, the responses obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation percentages 
were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain 
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was 
completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of 
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for 
information security across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable 
was the budget allocations and the independent variable was the institution type.  
To answer Research Question 3, the respondents were asked to rank their overall 
information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5. The responses obtained from similar 
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type to 
obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions). The analysis of the data collected 
was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of 
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institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall threat preparation 
index across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the self-
reported information security preparedness level and the independent variable was the institution 
type.  
In addition, analyses correlating the institutional threat identifications, threat prevention 
measures, frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocations 
with the overall institutional information security preparedness were performed. A comparative 
analysis of security measures that the institutions indicated that they did not perform was also 
completed. 
Variables 
The dependent variables for this study were the institutions’ self-reported perceptions of 
security threats and effectiveness of threat prevention initiatives aggregated to the level of the 
five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedure) along with 
frequencies of key security measures and allocation of institutional budgets for information 
security. The independent variable for this study was the different types of educational 
institutions in the state of Florida involved in the study, namely public and private PK-12 
institutions, public and private universities, and virtual schools. 
Delimitations 
Certain delimitations existed within this study. This research focused on analyzing the 
preparedness of educational institutions to ensure information security. The data collected for 
this research took place during the month of March 2018. The research population included chief 
information officers or equivalent or their designees in a cross section of educational institutions. 
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This study did not measure the long-term effects of any security measure that these institutions 
may have undertaken. This study did not make any recommendations to these institutions to 
implement any particular information security policy or measure. 
Limitations 
Certain limitations existed within this explorative study. The selected sample was not 
expected to be representative of the population of interest (the state of Florida), and thus findings 
were not generalizable although some findings had the potential to be generalized with caution. 
The researcher examined the characteristics of the sample ex post facto to determine the extent to 
which the sample might be representative of the population. In addition, this study included 
responses from the persons in charge of information security at different types of educational 
institutions. Differences exist in administration of security policies across similar type of 
institutions and those may not be properly reflected in any conclusion drawn from the responses. 
In contrast, any specific security measure adopted in an institution with some degree of success 
may not have the same effect in a similar institution due to other factors. Respondents selected to 
take part in this study completed the self-reported ISPI©; as such, it is possible for them to either 
over rate or under rate their security policies and perceptions of security threats. 
Assumptions 
 This study was conducted with the following assumptions: (a) the respondents responded 
to the ISPI© accurately and honestly; (b) respondents voluntarily completed the ISPI© and could 
have withdrawn from the study at any point in time; (c) respondents understood the vocabulary 
and concepts associated with the ISPI©; and (d) the interpretation of the data accurately reflected 
the perceptions of the respondents. 
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Organization of the Study 
The report of this exploratory research study is organized into five separate chapters. 
Chapter 1 describes the background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, 
significance of the study, definition of terms, conceptual framework, research questions, 
methodology, limitations, delimitations, and the assumptions of the study. Chapter 2 presents a 
review of the existing literature on this topic. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and 
procedures which were used in this study. It includes the selection of participants, 
instrumentation, data collection, and data analysis procedures. Chapter 4 presents the study’s 
findings including the results of the data analyses for the three research questions which guided 
the study. Chapter 5 contains a summary of the entire study, discussion of the findings, 
implications of the findings for theory and practice, recommendations for further research, and 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Educational institutions have always been affected significantly by data breaches. 
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data Breaches report that tracks 
all reported data breaches starting from 2005, almost 25 million user records have been breached 
in educational institutions. In between 2005 and April 2018, there have been 815 reported data 
breaches in educational institutions (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). In the 2017 and 2018 
editions of the annual data breach investigations report published by Verizon Enterprises, a total 
of 747 incidents were identified in educational institutions in 2016 and 2017 alone, 174 with 
confirmed data disclosure (Data Breach Investigations Report, 2017/2018). Much research has 
been conducted within the fields of identifying the threats to data security, assessing their 
impacts, and implementing safeguards to counter them; however little research has been 
conducted pertaining to (a) the preparedness of educational institutions to handle data security 
threats and (b) security practices and preparedness across different types of educational 
institutions.  
Information security is a dynamic area that is constantly changing (Vacca, 2012). To 
keep up with this constantly changing environment, educational institutions need to identify their 
existing gaps in information security areas by conducting effective risk assessments and address 
those gaps with implementations of effective security measures with adequate budgetary support 
(Eling & Loperfido, 2017). The unique characteristics of educational institutions, however, often 
pose a challenge to attainment of this objective.  
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In terms of storage of personal identifying information (PII), educational institutions have 
requirements and practices that are like those of their counterparts in industry. Educational 
institutions store a significant amount of PII, including educational and health records, and 
identity information of all personnel involved which may include students, parents, teachers, 
faculty, administrators and staff (Levy & Ramim, 2016). An average educational institution, 
however, often lags behind an average industrial enterprise in terms of monetary investment and 
technical infrastructure necessary for securing such PII adequately. The security measures 
adopted by educational institutions are often not up to the standards desired in the world of 
information systems (Cavusoglu et al., 2015). Analyses of cyber-security often reveal that 
educational institutions have not adequately addressed the cyber-security issues by having 
appropriate plans in place. Furthermore, such analyses also reveal that information security has 
often not been considered a key requirement in many educational institutions. Consequently, the 
volume of data breaches affecting educational institutions has constantly grown. (Powerhouses 
and Benchwarmers, 2014). Data breaches are expensive. Once their security infrastructure is 
breached, educational institutions often incur additional expenses in the terms of legal costs, 
post-breach remedial costs and intangible costs like loss of goodwill (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). 
Also, they can be subject to class action lawsuits in the wake of a data breach (IT Security for 
Higher Education: A Legal Perspective, 2003). In an era, where budget shortage in the field of 
education is a recurring phenomenon, all these factors may continue to contribute to the existing 
monetary investment deficit for information security that educational institutions have with 
industrial enterprises (Mitchell et al., 2014). 
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In terms of timings of breach detection, educational institutions are in a disadvantageous 
position as compared to their industry counterparts. The user-base of educational institutions has 
typically been comprised of children and young adults whose identity information once 
compromised may not be misused instantly, but often years later when they move to the 
workforce. As such, a detection of a breach is more challenging (Farina, 2015). 
In terms of operating culture, there are differences too between educational institutions 
and industrial enterprises. Although industrial enterprises tend to operate in a profit-centric 
closed environment, educational institutions have a relatively open culture focused on learning 
and learner convenience. Thus, the dilemma of balancing the conflicting needs of security and 
convenience is much higher in educational institutions (Strawser & Joy, 2015). 
Thus, information security has been and continues to be a critical yet relatively neglected 
area in educational institutions. Furthermore, there are potential differences among the types of 
educational institutions in terms of operating media (example virtual schools vs traditional 
schools), budgetary support, data breach targets (protected research materials in universities vs 
PII in schools), security policies, technical expertise, content management, infrastructure, and 
budget allocations. This makes the process of generalizing the picture applicable to all 
educational institutions difficult (Hentea, 2005). A comparative analyses of security 
preparedness among the different types of educational institutions is essential. 
This chapter, based on review of literature pertaining to information security in 
educational institutions, consists of eight sections. The first section concentrates on the 
characteristics of data stored in educational institutions and their vulnerabilities. The second 
section illustrates some major data breaches in educational institutions that occurred in recent 
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years. The third section illustrates the costs of a data breach, highlighting the difficulties of 
ascertaining such costs. The fourth section highlights the post-breach requirements and legal 
implications. The fifth section identifies the known common threats that take advantage of 
vulnerabilities in the five components of information systems. The sixth section concentrates on 
the known safeguards against data breaches. The seventh section identifies critical measures that 
institutions need to perform frequently to better protect themselves from security threats, and 
finally the eighth section illustrates the impact of budgetary support for information security in 
educational institutions. 
An understanding of the literature pertaining to information security discussed in the 
following eight sections was instrumental in designing the Information Security Preparedness 
Instrument (ISPI©) that was created and used exclusively for this study. 
Data in Educational Institutions 
The bulk of the data stored in information systems maintained for educational institutions 
can be classified into three main categories: (a) personal identifying information from school 
records, (b) information stored in medical centers, and (c) financial information (Kroenke & 
Boyle, 2015). Following are descriptions of the data in each of these categories. 
Personal identifying information from school records (PII) refers to attributes that can 
uniquely identify a person. These data can include name, address, birth-date, social security 
number, and financial information (Chen, Wu, Shen, & Ji, 2011). Educational institutions store a 
large volume of personal information data from students, faculty, teachers, parents, staff and 
administrators (Markos, Labrecque, & Milne, 2018). Data breaches of PII in recent times have 
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occurred in relatively smaller educational institutions as well as in premier institutions of higher 
education (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). 
In regard to information stored in medical centers, many educational institutions, 
particularly higher education institutions have medical centers on or off campus that treat 
students, staff and often the public as well. In case of large universities that have a medical 
school, such centers are part of the institution itself. These medical centers store PII and medical 
records of patients. In recent times, the number of healthcare data breaches in such medical 
centers have continued to increase. Sometimes breaches are targeted at campus student health 
centers, rather than large-scale medical centers (McLeod & Dolezel, 2018). Under section 
13402(e)(4) of the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH Act), institutions that experience a breach of unsecured protected health information 
affecting 500 or more individuals must report to the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, who then must report a list of the breaches. Therefore, the institutions are 
required to publicize any large-scale compromise of confidential or sensitive information that 
they have experienced (Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 2018).  
Student financial information which includes account balances, loan history, credit 
information, credit cards, debit cards, and other payment forms is often stored in the information 
systems maintained by educational institutions. Many institutions have put in place payment card 
systems that allow students to make payments on-campus and at certain off-campus venues 
(Ngai, Hu, Wong, Chen & Sun, 2011). Additionally, these institutions often use consumer credit 
reports for background checks on employees and for determining if students should obtain loans 
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). This wide array of financial information is extremely valuable to 
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perpetrators interested in identity theft and is therefore very vulnerable to data breaches 
(Shannon & Farley, 2012). 
Breaches in Educational Institutions – Case Studies 
Breaches Involving Personal Identifying Information 
On February 4, 2016, The University of Central Florida (UCF) notified current and 
former students of a data breach when they discovered unauthorized access into the university 
system. Two groups of individuals associated with UCF were primarily affected. The first group 
included some current student-athletes, as well as some former student-athletes who last played 
for UCF in 2014-15. This group also included some student staff members, such as managers, 
supporting UCF teams. The second group included current and former university employees in a 
category known as OPS, or Other Personal Services. Examples of positions in this category 
include undergraduate student employees (including those in work-study positions), graduate 
assistants, housing resident assistants, adjunct faculty instructors, and student government 
leaders. The University responded by offering free credit monitoring services, launching a large-
scale investigation into the breach, and holding information sessions on information security 
(Data Security/Data Breach, 2016). 
On September 15, 2015, Louisiana State University (LSU) reported that a doctor 
associated with the LSU Health New Orleans School of Medicine had his laptop stolen which 
may have exposed the personal information of 5,000 patients. The laptop computer was stolen 
from the doctor’s vehicle when it was parked in front of his home on July 16 or 17. The theft was 
reported, but the item was not recovered at the time of the report. The information contained on 
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this laptop included names, dates of birth and medical information of the affected patients. LSU 
offered a one-year subscription to a credit monitoring service for any patients affected by the 
breach (LSU doc’s stolen laptop, 2015). 
On October 1, 2014, the Provo City School District notified employees of a "phishing" 
attack attempted on Monday September 29, 2014 which allowed access to employee’s email 
accounts. Some employee email accounts contained files that may have had personally 
identifiable information (Provo City School District, 2014). 
On February 18, 2014, the University of Maryland reported a breach of data systems by a 
computer security attack. The breached database included 287,580 records of students, staff, 
faculty, and affiliated persons. The data accessed included names, dates of birth, University 
identification numbers, and social security numbers of affected individuals. The University 
responded by offering free credit monitoring services, launching a large-scale investigation into 
the breach, and holding information sessions on data privacy (UMD Data Breach, 2014). 
On February 25, 2014, Indiana University notified the Indiana Attorney General that 
personal data for students and recent graduates might have potentially been exposed, including 
names, addresses, and social security numbers for roughly 146,000 individuals. The University 
opened a call center to establish whether or not any of the individuals were victims of identity 
theft. Because the data were encrypted, it was difficult for hackers to decode and ultimately, no 
cases of identity theft were found. In July 2014, the University shut down the call center and 
closed the investigation, but not until after spending a reported $130,000.67 (IU says no victims 
reported in data breach, 2014). 
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Personal information can also be found in admissions records stored in educational 
institutions. In March 2013, hackers accessed a database of student admission records at 
Kirkwood Community College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. They used an international Internet 
Protocol (IP) address to unlawfully access a website maintained by the college with archived 
application information. The information accessed may have included applicant names, 
birthdates, race, contact information and social security numbers. The Community College 
responded by alerting law enforcement, hiring an outside firm to do a forensic analysis of the 
breach, and offering credit monitoring to affected individuals (Kirkwood Website Experienced 
Unlawful Access, 2013). 
Breaches Involving Medical Records 
On November 26, 2013, the University of Pennsylvania reported a paper breach that 
affected 3,000 individuals. Additionally, there was a paper theft on the same campus affecting 
661 individuals that occurred from May 1, 2014 to June 19, 2014. The paper theft involved 
stolen receipts from a locked office that included information such as patient name, date of birth, 
and the last four digits of credit card numbers. The University sent notification letters and began 
an internal investigation (Burling, 2014). 
In March 2014, the University of California – Irvine experienced a breach of student 
information. Three computers in the Student Health Center were infected with a keylogging virus 
that captured keystrokes as the user typed and transmitted that information to hackers. The 
information collected included names, unencrypted medical information, bank names as well as 
addresses and other medical information. The University offered free credit reporting services to 
affected students (UC Irvine Student Heath Center, 2014). 
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Cost of Data Breaches 
 Data breaches cost money. In some cases, the cost of a data breach is so large that it can 
put an enterprise out of business. The cost of data breaches often includes regulatory fines such 
as HIPAA/HITECH and PCI DSS. Other costs result from loss of business, state notification 
laws, and fixing the security issues that lead to the breach (Gardner & Thomas, 2014). It is often 
extremely difficult to determine the full extent of the financial and data losses due to a security 
breach. As a result, a relatively small number of organizations calculate such costs due to the 
complexity and unknowns involved, and even fewer publish such findings (Furnell, 2009). In 
2015, Kroenke and Boyle reported there were no standards for tallying and calculating cyber-
crime costs. Moreover, they raised some unanswered questions: 
a. Does the cost of a cyber-attack include lost employee time, lost revenue and long-term 
revenue losses due to loss of clients or customers? 
b. What is the cost that may result from the loss of goodwill or reputation that an institution 
invariably endures after a data breach? 
c. If an equipment for example a laptop worth $1,500 is stolen, does the replacement cost 
include the value of the data that was stored in it or the cost of the time necessary to 
replace it or re-install software on it? 
Studies to determine cost of cyber-crimes have almost always been based on surveys. Often 
different respondents interpret terms differently (Leveson, 2012). Moreover, there are some 
organizations that do not report all their losses and there are some that do not report cyber-crime 
losses at all (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). In the absence of standards and accurate ways of 
gathering crime data, estimates are not always reliable (Leveson, 2012).  
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One potential helpful metric is year-to-year trend analysis, assuming the same methodology 
is used by the various survey respondents. Table 1 shows the results of such a survey completed 
over four years from 2010 to 2013 (Cost of Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute, 2013). 
Amounts shown are in millions of US dollars and indicate computer crime costs per 
organizational respondent. This survey was commissioned by Hewlett-Packard and performed by 
the Ponemon Institute, a consulting group that specializes in computer crime. 
 
Table 1  
 
Computer Crime Costs*: Ponemon Institute 
Costs 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Maximum $51.9 $36.5 $46.0 $58.1 
Median   $3.8   $5.9   $6.2   $9.1 
Minimum   $1.0   $1.5   $1.4   $1.3 
 
Note. Costs shown in millions of US dollars 
Source. Cost of Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute (2013). 
 
These data underline the problems of tallying crime data from surveys. For example, in 2013, 
no organization reported a figure less than $1.3 million in loss. It is reasonable to assume that the 
survey did not include small companies that incurred much smaller losses. Given the large 
number of small companies, those unknown and unaccounted losses could be substantial (Cost of 
Cyber Crime Study – Ponemon Institute, 2013). 
 Recent studies have indicated that the cost incurred by an educational institution in the 
event of a data breach is increasing and was $260 per record breached in 2017 with a 4-year 
average of $200 per record (“Cost of Data Breach Study”, 2017). 
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Post-Breach Requirements 
The most critical component of a data breach for an educational institution is its financial 
implications. Some of these institutions, particularly the smaller ones are not prepared for the 
high costs of remedying and recovering from a breach and providing services to victims of the 
breach (O’Neil, 2014). In addition, only a few institutions have had cyber insurance to help 
offset these costs. Post-breach expenses can include forensics consultants, lawyers, call centers, 
websites, mailings, identity-protection and credit-check services, and litigation. An intangible 
expense is the damage to an institution’s reputation that occurs when it experiences a breach of 
data security (O’Neil, 2014). It can be especially difficult for public institutions that rely on state 
funding to absorb the costs of a cyber-attack (Bielski, 2005). 
Data breach insurance is available to educational institutions to help protect them in case 
a breach occurs. As the threat of cyber-attacks has increased, so have the number of companies 
buying cyber insurance. Some insurance carriers have begun to specifically market cyber 
insurance for educational institutions. Insurance benefits may include protections for breach of 
contract claims, computer forensics, notification costs, regulatory actions, healthcare protections 
in the case of an on-campus medical center, and hacker damage (Young, Lopez, Rice, Ramsey & 
McTasney, 2016). 
Unfortunately, cyber insurance is expensive and often difficult to obtain. Some insurance 
companies have required institutions to have strong security procedures in place to be eligible for 
insurance. If the educational institutions are implementing proper procedures per the FERPA 
guidelines and the GLBA Safeguard Procedures, their chances of obtaining such insurance 
increase (Fernandes, 2014). 
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Timely notification is important. It is important for educational institutions to be familiar 
with their state’s data breach notification laws. There is a wide variation in the laws of each state 
with respect to the definition of what constitutes a data breach, what a timely notification is, and 
who needs to be notified. Moreover, some states impose data protection laws on out-of-state 
entities, which means physical presence in the state is often not required for an institution to be 
subject to the law. Therefore, if an institution has students from a wide array of states, it may be 
subject to the notification requirements of each state (Bakhshi, Papadaki & Furnell, 2009). 
In Florida, the notification must occur no later than 30 days following determination of 
the breach. Some state statutes do not have any set amount of time but rather require notification 
in the most expedient time possible (Burdon, Reid & Low, 2010). 
Most educational institutions deal with breaches by offering free credit monitoring to the 
affected individuals which may include students, faculty, teachers and staff. This involves 
significantly high costs which might make it more difficult for smaller entities to fund (Young et 
al., 2016). Offering credit monitoring is often a positive response to a data breach that might 
convince victims not to sue and convince the court not to levy too harsh a penalty in the case of a 
suit (UMD Data Breach, 2014). 
Legal Implications of Data Breaches 
Educational institutions are subject to federal regulations and state statutes which dictate 
the legal implications of a data breach. Some of the most important ones include the following: 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), FERPA and Cloud Computing, FERPA and Online Educational Services, 
State Consumer Protection Statutes. These are discussed in the following paragraphs 
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 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) focuses on health 
insurance portability and on the prevention of health care fraud and abuse by the adoption of 
standards and requirements for electronic transmission of health information. There are three 
separate part of HIPAA’s information security component: the privacy regulations, the electronic 
transaction standards, and the security regulations. These three parts regulate the security 
standards for protected health information, the privacy of patient-identifiable information, and 
the standardization of electronic transactions (Sitko, 2003). 
Education institutions fall under the definition of an entity covered under HIPAA if they 
provide health care services and engage in one or more covered electronic transactions. 
Electronic transactions include health care claims, health care payments, coordination of 
benefits, eligibility for a health plan, and enrollment in a health plan (Liginlal, Sim, Khansa, & 
Fearn, 2012 ). Many educational institutions fall under HIPAA because they provide health 
services to students and often run medical centers in association with their medical programs. 
However, because of the exception for FERPA educational records, if a center solely services 
students, it may be exempt from HIPAA (Sitko, 2003). 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act 
covers electronic medical records and requires a covered entity to notify affected individuals 
when unsecured personal health information has been breached. It extended application of both 
the security and privacy rules of HIPAA. It also amended HIPAA to increase civil and criminal 
penalties, require notification of data breaches, and change disclosure rules, among others (Stark, 
2010). 
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The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) covers educational institutions 
that receive funds for programs administered by the Department of Education. The information 
covered includes education records, defined as records that contain information directly related 
to a student and are maintained by the educational institution. Additionally, directory information 
is covered, defined as information that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion 
of privacy if disclosed. Because directory information is not harmful, all that is required of a 
covered educational institution is public notice of the categories of information which it has 
designated as such information. Like HIPAA, FERPA does not establish a private cause of 
action. Only the Secretary of Health and Human Services can bring an action to enforce FERPA 
(Hillison, Pacini, & Williams, 2001). In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that 
a plaintiff could not sue for damages under 28 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce a FERPA provision 
(Gonzaga University v. Doe, 2002). 
The use of cloud computing has increased significantly in recent years. Some critics have 
suggested amendment of FERPA with respect to cloud computing to promote more efficient 
usage. Educational institutions are beginning to take advantage of the convenience of cloud 
computing as they are drawn to its increased efficiency, mobile access, innovation and access to 
new services. They are moving storage, messaging, video conferencing and computing power to 
the cloud (Chopra, Mung, & Chopra, 2013). 
In recent years, online education has increased significantly. This has caused a significant 
increase in the use of online educational services including software, mobile applications, and 
web-based tools created by third parties by educational institutions. Some of these services use 
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FERPA-protected information, while others collect metadata related to that information (Moore 
& Shelton, 2013).  
Most states have data breach notification laws. While many such laws have broad 
provisions that hold anyone in possession of personal information liable for a data breach, some 
of them are considerably narrower in that they only require notification by specific agencies or 
businesses in the event of a breach. Moreover, states differ as to who must be notified; some 
require notification only to consumers, while others require entities to notify credit reporting 
agencies or the government (Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 2008). 
Threats Affecting Educational Institutions 
 A threat is an entity that attempts to obtain and manipulate information systems data via 
illegal and secretive means (Jouini et al., 2014). The many threats that are encountered today in 
the world of information systems that may apply to educational institutions can be broadly 
grouped into five main categories based on the components of information systems: (a) 
hardware, (b) software, (c) data, (d) procedures and (e) people (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). The 
following paragraphs provide additional detail regarding each of these five main categories. 
Hardware-Oriented Threats 
Theft 
 Theft of electronic devices is a major source of data breaches. These devices can include 
laptops, desktop computers, portable electronic devices such as smart phones, or intact hard 
drives. A study conducted in 2010 found that theft of such devices compromised seven million 
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sensitive medical records, and student personal information records from 2009 to the beginning 
of 2010 (Rhodes & Polley, 2014). 
Many educational institutions have a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy that allows 
users to use their personal devices for professional work (Nicholson & O’Reardon, 2009). 
Allowing personal devices often allows the transfer of confidential institutional information to 
the device. Because the device is personal, the educational institution cannot adequately control 
its security protocols and access policies. Thus, the theft of such personal devices, which are 
often not encrypted, can put student information at risk (Rhodes & Polley, 2014). 
Natural Disasters 
This category includes fires, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural disasters 
that an educational institution may encounter. For example, given their geographic location, 
educational institutions in Florida are often prone to exposure by hurricanes every year. 
Extensive loss to institutional data might take place due to natural disasters if adequate measures 
are not undertaken. Most educational institutions have extensive disaster recovery plans to help 
them recover quickly in the event a natural disaster takes place. (Conrad, Misenar, & Feldman, 
2016). 
Sniffing 
Sniffing is a technique for intercepting network-based traffic and communications 
between a source and a destination computer. If wired networks are involved, this technique 
relies on physical connectivity. However, with wireless networks which are used heavily 
nowadays, no such physical connection is necessary. Network sniffers simply take devices with 
wireless connections through an area and search for unprotected wireless networks. If they find 
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one, they can easily monitor and intercept wireless traffic. Sometimes, even wireless networks 
that are protected are vulnerable if the security protocols enforced are not strong enough 
(Singleton, Singleton & Gottlieb, 2006). 
Payment Card Skimmers 
 Payment card skimmers are often used by perpetrators to electronically capture a victim's 
personal information from their credit or debit cards. This information can be subsequently used 
by identity thieves. The skimmer is a small device that scans a credit card and captures the 
personal information contained in the magnetic strip of the credit card. Educational institutions 
that deploy payment terminals that accept credit or debit card payments are often vulnerable to 
have users’ PII stolen using such skimmers. Duplicate cards are often created using that 
information and used thereafter, almost immediately, before such a fraudulent use can be 
detected (Rockwell, 2013). 
Software-Oriented Threats 
Ransomware 
Ransomware is a form of software that prevents or limits users from accessing their 
systems or personal computers. This type of software forces its victims to pay a demanded 
ransom through certain specified online payment methods to regain access to their systems, or to 
reclaim their data back. The ransom price is often quoted in its bitcoin equivalent. It is important 
to note that paying the ransom does not guarantee that users eventually regain access to the 
infected system. In certain cases, they only reclaim part of the data (Al-rimy, Maarof, & Shaid, 
2018). 
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Users may encounter this threat through a variety of means. Ransomware can be 
inadvertently downloaded by unsuspecting users if they visit malicious or compromised 
websites. Some ransomware is often delivered as an attachment to an email.  Once executed in 
the system, ransomware can either lock the computer screen or encrypt predetermined files with 
a key. In the first scenario, ransomware shows a full-screen image or notification, which prevents 
victims from using their system. This notification typically delivers the instructions on how users 
can pay for the ransom. The second type of ransomware locks files like documents, spreadsheets 
and other important files (Mansfield-Devine, 2017). 
Two very common and fast-spreading ransomwares are the WannaCry and the LOCKY. 
These ransomwares spread typically via attachments to emails often as a JavaScript-file. They 
can also be spread through executable files. Once the attachment is accessed, the JavaScript runs 
a program that encrypts all files on the user’s computer including those on network drives, 
removes the originals and deletes any system restore point so that the machine can never be 
reverted to an earlier state. It then creates a desktop message (as shown in Figure 2) that asks the 
user to pay the ransom using bitcoins via a TOR browser (Furnell & Emm, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 2. Ransomware – LOCKY. 
Source: Stetson University. (2018). Information Security Handbook. DeLand, FL. 
 39 
Unless the user has the data backed up in an alternate location, data-loss is inevitable in 
such a scenario. A South Carolina school district paid an estimated $10,000 in 2016 when cyber-
criminals locked its computer servers. As per the Federal Bureau of Investigation, cyber-
criminals collected $209 million using ransomware in the first three months of 2016 by extorting 
businesses and institutions to unlock computer servers. (Fitzpatrick & Griffin, 2016). 
Malware 
 The term malware refers to an assortment of viruses, spyware, and other unwanted 
software that can get installed on a users’ computers or mobile devices without their knowledge 
or consent. This often happens when a user visits a malicious website or downloads an 
unauthorized program from the web (Noor, Abbas, & Shahid, 2018). These programs can cause 
the device to crash. More importantly, they can be used to monitor and control the user’s online 
activity. They can often make the device deliver unwanted or inappropriate ads (Pectas & 
Acarman, 2017). 
 There are many different types of malware, from spyware to key loggers, to computer 
viruses. Some types of malware, such as financial malware, which is designed to scan a 
computer system for information related to financial transactions, are more common than other 
types (Noor et al., 2018). One example is a malware named Cridex. It monitors login pages, 
cookies and steals user credentials (Touchette, 2016). Other common ones like the FAKEAV 
malware trick users into purchasing bogus anti-malware software by showing fake anti-malware 
scanning results (Pectas & Acarman, 2017). 
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Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection 
 SQL injection is a type of security attack in which the attacker adds Structured Query 
Language (SQL) code to a web form input box, which in turn makes changes to data within the 
database. This allows the perpetrator to gain access to unauthorized resources and information. 
This information may include sensitive institutional data, user lists or personal information of 
users, which are typically used for subsequent fishing attacks (Cherry, 2015). 
Web Application Attacks 
 Web application attacks are conducted using software programs that are written to probe 
a user's computer and automatically exploit security holes or vulnerabilities if any. Such exploits 
may provide a path into the user's system core for subsequent deeper intrusions (Wilhelm, 2013). 
Some hackers may inject malicious code within vulnerable web applications to trick users and 
redirect them towards phishing sites that they maintain. This technique is called cross-site 
scripting and may be used even when there are no vulnerabilities in the associated web servers 
and database engines. (Razzaq, Latif, Ahmad, Hur, Anwar, & Bloodsworth, 2014). 
Outdated Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware Software 
 Anti-virus and anti-malware software on personal computers and servers protect the 
machines from viruses and other malware threats. However, if these software programs are not 
kept up to date, they lose their efficiency and effectiveness as they cannot detect any newer 
threats that are created almost on a daily-basis (Bourne, 2014). 
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Data-Oriented Threats 
Unpatched systems 
 Computer systems and machines that have not been kept up to date with the latest 
security patches are the most vulnerable to be exploited. Unfortunately, some institutions are 
never up-to-date with their patching process due to lack of resources or personnel. In fact, 
patching computers is sometimes regarded as a tedious exercise and is not always seen as a 
vulnerability concern. Institutions often shy away from addressing regular patches and routine 
software upgrades because they have concerns about price, time, and complexity. Therefore, 
exploitation of unpatched systems remains a serious risk to institutions and the underlying cause 
of many data breaches (Andress, 2014). Recent years have seen significant advances in 
automated patching mechanisms, yet managing updates remains a challenge. Factors like the 
sheer number of updates, limited bandwidth, lack of security personnel can discourage 
institutions from patching as often as they should. This creates a security gap which can expose 
institutional data for unauthorized access (Furnell, Niekerk, & Clarke, 2014). 
Cyber – espionage 
 The term cyber-espionage stands for a set of processes that deals with the theft of  
intellectual property and confidential information from computer systems. Often these processes 
are politically motivated (Shakarian, Shakarian, & Ruef, 2013). In the education sector, cyber-
espionage primarily targets institutions of higher education, especially research universities as 
they usually store a vast collection of expensive and often unpublished research work 
(Thompson, 2015). 
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Institutional Data on Personal Devices 
 Increased use of personally owned devices offers convenience, productivity gains, and 
job satisfaction. Many educational institutions have a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy 
that allows users to use their personal smart phones, tablets or laptops for professional work 
(Nicholson & O’Reardon, 2009). There are, however, significant risks of data exposure if these 
devices are accessed by unauthorized individuals or entities. In addition, there is always a risk 
that data used on a personal device might violate institutional contracts or violate state or federal 
laws and regulations (Rhodes & Polley, 2014).  
Unencrypted Data Transfers 
 Educational institutions receive and send a large volume of data as part of their routine 
operations. Such data is transmitted through computer networks all the time. To maintain the 
security of the data being transferred, it needs to be encrypted with security keys which can only 
be decrypted by the intended recipient. If left unencrypted, sensitive data may be intercepted and 
exposed (Rashti, Sabin, & Kettimuthu, 2016). 
Institutional Data on Third Party Services 
 With the advent of cloud-based services, more and more institutional data are being 
shared with third-party providers of cloud-based services to conduct business. Institutional data 
remains vulnerable if adequate security measures are not implemented by such third-party 
providers (Tan, Hijazi, Lim, & Gani, 2018). 
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Procedure-Oriented Threats 
Hacking  
Hacking involves breaking into computers, servers, or networks to steal data such as 
customer lists, product inventory data, employee data, and other proprietary and confidential data 
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Typically, inadequate security protocols implemented by the system 
administrators or unsafe practices by its users facilitate the processes involved in hacking. Those 
include weak passwords, short passwords, and commonly-used passwords among others. Short 
passwords are especially vulnerable to a brute force attack in which the password cracker tries 
every possible combination of characters. The shorter the password, the higher the chances of it 
being cracked. Commonly-used passwords like “password” are relatively easy to guess (Shen, 
Yu, Xu, Yan, & Guan, 2016). Sophisticated probing processes used by hackers often scan 
browser cookies on public computers. Browser cookies are small files that a browser stores on a 
user’s computer. When the user visits web sites, cookies enable access to sites without having to 
sign in every time, and they speed up processing on some sites. However, some cookies also 
contain sensitive security data from visited authenticated sites that may be read by malicious 
hackers (Gold, 2011).  
Spoofing 
Spoofing is term used to describe someone pretending to be someone else. Internet 
Protocol (IP) spoofing occurs when an intruder uses another web-site’s IP address to masquerade 
as the original web-site (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). By modifying the source address of attacking 
traffic to an address assigned to others or not assigned, or by using a proxy-machine with a fake 
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IP address, attackers can hide their actual locations, or bypass established access control rules 
(Yao, Bi, & Xiao, 2013). 
Denial of Service 
A denial of service (DoS) is a type of attack where the attackers attempt to prevent 
legitimate users from accessing a service. In a DoS attack, the attacker sends an extremely high 
number of bogus messages asking the network or server to authenticate requests which in turn 
have invalid return addresses. Consequently, the network or server is unable to find the return 
address of the attacker when sending the authentication approval, causing the server to wait 
before closing the connection. When the server closes the connection, the attacker sends more 
bogus authentication messages with invalid return addresses. Hence, the process of 
authentication and server wait will resume, keeping the network or server extremely busy and 
inaccessible for legitimate users (Oliveira, Laranjeiro, & Vieira, 2015). 
Elevation of Privilege 
 A privilege elevation attack is a type of network intrusion that takes advantage of errors 
in programming logic or flaws in design to grant the attacker elevated access to the network. 
Elevation of privilege results from an attacker gaining authorization permissions above and 
beyond those originally granted. For example, an attacker with a privilege set of read only 
permissions somehow elevates the set to include read and write (Knapp & Langill, 2015). 
Inadequate Security Monitoring 
 Even the most sophisticated security measures can be rendered ineffective without 
adequate monitoring. Monitoring a computer system typically includes installing software on the 
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network that sends alerts to the administrators of the system about any issues that the system may 
be experiencing. Additional benefits of real-time analytics may be obtained by using such 
monitoring software. Unfortunately, some institutions are not pro-active in implementing 
security monitoring which increases the possibilities of intrusion attempts going undetected 
(Sanders, 2014). 
Inadequate Backups of Institutional Data 
 Inadequate data backups invariably cause critical data losses. Data volume, limited 
storage capacity, and inadequate backup and restore policies are backup related challenges. At 
the time of the present study, explosive data growth had further compounded these performance 
and capacity issues. To maintain efficiency of institutional operations, data needs to be backed 
up frequently, restored quickly, and protected constantly (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). 
People-Oriented Threats 
Improper Disposal Practices 
 Although most personal information is now stored electronically, there can be breaches 
resulting from an improper disposal of paper records involving personally identifiable 
information (Leveson, 2012). These paper breaches make up nearly 26% of breaches 
(Chronology of Data Breaches, 2018). Sometimes the breach comes from something as simple as 
a user throwing confidential institutional information in the trash as opposed to taking more 
secure measures such as shredding them before disposing. The same issue can arise with 
electronic records due to the improper disposal of hard drives or other media in publicly 
accessible places (Leveson, 2012). 
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User Errors 
User errors may result from accidental and/or negligent human actions. For example, a 
school system database administrator may inadvertently install an old database on top of an 
existing one causing loss or corruption of data. In contrast, a school administrative staff-member 
may store a data file with confidential information on a publicly accessible folder, thereby 
exposing it to the whole world via the web (Leveson, 2012). 
Phishing 
Phishing is a technique for obtaining unauthorized data that primarily happens via email 
messages. The perpetrator claims to be a legitimate company and sends an email (that looks very 
similar to the original site in look and feel) requesting confidential data, such as social security 
numbers, and account passwords, among others (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Often, they send a 
link in an email that takes the user to a fake login page that looks very similar to one that the 
recipient is accustomed to visit. The unsuspecting user may enter his credentials on such a page 
thereby exposing them to the perpetrator (Aleroud & Zhou, 2017). 
Weak Passwords 
 Some passwords are easy to guess or crack with password identification algorithms. 
These include weak passwords, short passwords, and commonly used passwords among others. 
Short passwords are especially vulnerable to a brute force attack in which the password cracker 
tries every possible combination of characters. The shorter the password, the higher the chances 
of it being cracked. Commonly-used passwords like “password” are relatively easy to guess 
(Shen et al., 2016). 
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Malicious Insider 
 Malicious insider threats refer to deliberate attempts by an insider to access and 
potentially harm an organization's data, systems or IT infrastructure often for financial gain, 
retribution, or some other motivation (Jones, 2008). These types of threats are often extremely 
difficult to detect and mitigate, as an insider may potentially be more knowledgeable than an 
external attacker about the target system and is therefore more effective at defeating security 
controls that mainly defend against external attacks (Liu, Wang, & Camp, 2008). 
Safeguards against Data Breaches 
 Information is one of the most prominent assets for educational institutions and therefore 
needs to be protected from security threats. Prevention of data breach initiatives involve applying 
safeguards at both personal and institutional levels (Joshi & Singh, 2017). Some critical 
safeguards classified using the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, 
procedures, and people) are as follows: 
Hardware-Oriented safeguards 
Removing Stored Personal Identifying Information from Computers and Mobile Devices 
 Computers and mobile devices may potentially store personal identifying information 
(PII) of the owner. By using secure encryption techniques or by relying on biometric 
characteristics, such storage of PII may be avoided. In the event such devices are stolen or 
accessed by an unauthorized person, the absence of any PII on such devices may limit further 
damage of such being exposed (Lee, 2017).  
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Using Biometric Authentication for Accessing Secure Areas 
Biometric authentication is a security process that relies on the unique biological 
characteristics of individuals to verify their identities. Finger-prints are the most commonly used 
biometric characteristics that uniquely identify an individual. In recent times, eye-retina and 
face-recognitions have been increasingly used by institutions as well. Biometric authentication 
systems compare a biometric data capture to stored, authentic data in a secure database. If both 
match, authentication is confirmed. Typically, biometric authentication has been used to manage 
access to resources such as buildings, rooms and mobile devices (Ogbanufe & Kim, 2018). 
Software-Oriented Safeguards 
Clearing Browsing History, Temporary Files and Cookies from Public Computers 
Using cookies and browsing history that are stored on a user's machine may result in 
information may be obtained that may subject a user's account to unauthorized access. Further, a 
user may leave the machine without logging out from all services. Thus, on a public machine, the 
next user may get access to the previous user’s information. A critical safeguard in this situation 
for educational institutions is to program the system so that cookies and browsing history are 
removed from the browser when the user signs off. A provision to time out the user session once 
the user leaves his machine unattended after a certain amount of time has elapsed is helpful as 
well (Jia, Chen, Dong, Saxena, Mao, & Liang, 2015).  
Regularly Updating Anti-Virus and Anti-Malware Software  
 Anti-virus and anti-malware software on all institutional computers and servers protect 
those machines from virus and malware threats. However, if they are not kept up to date, they 
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lose their efficiency as they cannot detect new threats. Thus, keeping them automatically updated 
is critical for educational institutions(Townsend, 2010). 
Installing Institutional Firewall 
To protect the institutional network from security threats on the public internet, an 
educational institution may implement a firewall at the intersection of the institutional network 
boundary and the internet. The border firewall operates a “default deny” policy. This means that 
only traffic that has been specifically permitted is allowed through the firewall (Goralski, 2017).  
Installing Institutional Virtual Private Network 
A VPN, or Virtual Private Network, is a service that allows a user to connect to the 
internet via a server run by a VPN provider. All data traveling between the user's computer, 
phone or tablet and this “VPN server” is securely encrypted. Educational institutions may allow 
access to critical web-based services and applications from off-campus locations only via the 
VPN to prevent network-based intrusions (Richter & Wood, 2016). 
Data-Oriented Safeguards 
Using Central Authentication and Single Sign on 
Central authentication allows applications to authenticate the user based on credentials 
stored in a single repository. Single sign on allows users to access multiple applications after 
providing their credentials only once. In other words, a user can login to multiple web-
applications using the same username and password. Once the users are logged in to one web-
application, they are not required to provide their credentials for accessing another web-
application. They are signed on by default. Implementing both these measures allows the 
educational institutions to focus on implementing advanced security protocols at the sign in stage 
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which by design extend to all applicable web applications (Nacer, Djebari, Slimani, & Aissani, 
2017). 
Using Multi-factor Authentication 
Multifactor authentication (MFA) is a security protocol that requires more than one 
method of authentication from independent categories of credentials to verify the user’s identity 
for a login or other transaction. In an MFA scenario, users are initially presented a login screen 
to a web-application. Once they successfully enter their credentials, the system requires them to 
validate the authentication on another device, typically the user’s mobile phone to complete the 
process. The idea behind this safeguard is the reasoning that even if perpetrators know a users’ 
usernames and passwords, the possibility of their having access to a second device (the mobile 
phone in the example) at the same time is remote (Velasquez, Caro, & Rodriguez, 2018). 
Using Encryption for Data Transfer and Storage 
Data encryption translates data into another form, or code, so that only people with access 
to a secret key (formally called a decryption key) or password can read it. Encrypted data are 
commonly referred to as ciphertext, and unencrypted data is called plaintext. Currently, 
encryption is one of the most popular and effective data security methods used by educational 
institutions. Two main types of data encryption exist--asymmetric encryption, also known as 
public-key encryption, and symmetric encryption (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). 
User Authorization 
Authorization is the process of giving someone access and privileges to specific 
components of an information system. In multi-user computer systems, a system administrator 
defines for the system which users are allowed what levels of access to the system and what are 
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the privileges of use (example file directories, data access etc.). If done effectively and 
adequately, authorization can prevent data exposure by restricting access as necessary. 
(Information Resources Management Association, 2017). 
Procedure-Oriented Safeguards 
Implementing a Password Policy for Strong, Complex and Long Passwords   
 Researchers have shown that strong, long and complex passwords are a big deterrent to 
cyber perpetrators as they get exponentially difficult for them to crack them. Some rules for 
password complexity may include: creating passwords that are at least 8 characters long and 
containing one uppercase letter[A-Z], one lowercase letter[a-z], one numeric character [0-9] and 
one special character from the set: ` ! @ $ % ^ & * ( ) - _ = + [ ] ; :. Certain attributes like login 
ID, email address, first, or last name are not recommended to be a part of the password (Shen et 
al., 2016). 
To get an idea about the time it may take for a perpetrator using brute force methods to 
crack a password, modern algorithms show that the length plays the biggest role in establishing 
complexity. For example, nine-character passwords may take five days to break, 10-character 
passwords may take four months, and 11-character passwords may take ten years. If the length is 
increased to 12 characters, it may take up to 200 years to crack (Estimating Password Cracking 
Times, 2018). 
Making Users Change Passwords Frequently 
Password breaches may not be detected right after they happen. Often, they are not 
discovered until months go by. Having a policy of frequent password changes (at least once in 
three months) is a vital safeguard. This is critical for institutions as users often tend to use the 
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same password for multiple sites. If a perpetrator can guess a user’s password for one site, the 
other applicable sites to which that user has access may also be at risk as the potential for the 
password to be the same for multiple sites is relatively high (Woods & Siponen, 2018). 
Taking Regular Backups of Key Data 
A good backup strategy is essential for data security. A backup is the last line of defense 
against data loss, providing a way to restore original data (Groot, 2017). Backups are even more 
crucial if they are completed in real-time. This is because restoring from a backup even a day-old 
can result in partial data-loss especially for transactions or changes that happened after the last 
backup was taken (Cherry, 2015). This is a critical component for business continuity and 
disaster recovery protocols, especially for institutions in states like Florida that are prone to 
natural disasters and may experience data loss due to them (Torres & Alsharif, 2016).  
Implementing Post-intrusion Attempt Remediation Procedures 
A data-breach comes with legal implications which force educational institutions to take 
additional post-intrusion remediation steps. Some common procedures include informing the 
authorities, blocking rogue IP addresses, offering credit monitoring for affected users (Young et 
al., 2016). 
Applying Critical Server and System Patches Regularly 
A patch is a specialized software designed to update a computer program or its 
supporting data, to fix or improve it. This includes fixing security vulnerabilities and system 
malfunctions, also known as bugs. Thus, such fixes are called bug fixes. Institutions need to 
perform this critical step of applying patches and bug fixes on their information systems on a 
regular basis to improve their security, usability, and performance (Bourne, 2014).  
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People-Oriented Safeguards 
Avoid Opening Emails from Unknown Sources 
Emails are the primary media for directing users to phishing scam web-sites which are 
usually presented as links within the email. Educating the user base on the dangers of phishing 
and instructing them to avoid clicking on links in the email unless they are sure of their 
authenticity is a critical security measure (Vayansky & Kumar, 2018). 
Avoid Opening Attachments to Emails from Unknown Sources 
Attachments containing harmful malware and ransomware are often circulated using 
emails. Educating users about dangers of such attachments is critical so that they are careful 
about ignoring attachments from unknown sources (Sammons & Cross, 2017). 
Avoid Visiting Unauthorized Websites on Work Computers 
Unauthorized websites may contain hidden viruses that may get downloaded on the 
computers from which they are accessed and may subsequently damage institutional data by 
propagating through the institutional network. Some institutions enforce safe-use policies for 
work machines that prohibit users from visiting such unauthorized and black-listed websites 
(Tanaka, Akiyama, & Goto, 2017). 
Avoiding Sending Valuable and Confidential Data via Email or Instant Messages  
It is important to avoid sending confidential data using emails as messages may get 
intercepted in transit or be accidentally delivered to an unauthorized recipient if the email 
address is entered incorrectly. In addition, there is no guarantee that the recipients' email 
addresses are always accurate or have not been compromised. Thus, sending emails, while not 
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being completely sure of their intended destination, might expose such confidential data 
(Sammons & Cross, 2017). 
Check for Https in Website Addresses That Require Authentication 
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is the secure version of HTTP, the 
protocol over which data are sent between the users’ browsers and the websites that they are 
connected to. The ‘S’ at the end of HTTPS stands for Secure. It means all communications 
between the user's browser and the website are encrypted. Thus, checking for the presence of the 
https protocol is critical especially for websites that require users to enter credentials to verify 
their identity (Virvilis, Mylonas, Tsalis, & Gritzalis, 2015). 
Employ a Dedicated Information Security Officer 
The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is a senior-level executive responsible for 
developing and implementing an information security program, which includes procedures and 
policies designed to protect enterprise communications, systems and assets from both internal 
and external threats. Information security is a specialized dynamic area that requires expertise 
and training for optimal utility. Those institutions that invest in employing a dedicated CISO 
show the commitment to stay ahead of the information security challenge-curve (Hooper & 
McKissack, 2016) 
Training Users on New Security Threats 
The world of security threats changes constantly. New threats are launched regularly. It is 
imperative for an institution focused on information security to continually train its users on new 
security threats to keep them up to date (Caballero, 2017). 
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Frequency of Critical Measures 
 Implementation of data security measures in institutions is not enough by itself. The 
implemented measures need to be repeated at an acceptable frequency for them to remain 
effective. Some critical measures applicable to educational institutions are described in this 
section. They are classified as high or low frequency measures depending on the number of 
repetitions that can be completed within a year (Caballero, 2017). 
High Frequency Measures 
Measures that need to be repeated multiple times in a year for optimal effectiveness are 
classified as high frequency measures (Caballero, 2017). Three measures are discussed in the 
following paragraphs:  (a) honey pot experiments, (b) social engineering experiments to enforce 
security protocols, and (c) log review and monitoring. 
A honeypot is a computer system (typically a server on the network) that is set up by 
security administrators of an institution to act as a decoy to lure cyber-attackers. This is done by 
relaxing security protocols on the server, thereby making it visible and inducing cyber-attackers 
to attempt to get into it. No confidential information is stored on that server, but some fake 
information may be entered to make the data look authentic. The purpose of such honeypot 
experiments is to gain an insight into attempts to gain unauthorized access to information 
systems as they apply to that institution so that they can be better prepared to counter them 
(Christopher, Choo, & Dehghantanha, 2017). 
To ensure that their users are following adequate security protocols, institutions may send 
communications like phishing emails on a periodic basis to a cross-section of their user-base to 
check the responses. The selection of users identified to receive such emails may initially be 
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made at random but later targeted to ensure that repeat offenders or those with a propensity to be 
phished are always included. Penalties for clicking on the links in the email include curbing 
access to critical services for such users, pending their passing compulsory security classes. For 
repeat offenses, their access may be suspended or in more severe cases, the employee may be 
terminated (Gardner & Thomas, 2014; Stetson University, 2018). 
A breach can be identified much before it is reported to have happened. Any access or 
attempts to access an institution’s servers and network are recorded in system and server logs. 
Administrators could review and monitor these logs for clues and patterns that may help them 
identify potential breaches or intrusion attempts to access the institution’s information systems 
(Wang, Liu, Pitsilis, & Zhang, 2018).  
Low Frequency Measures 
Due to the time and resources involved, some of the critical measures are not cost-
effective enough to be repeated multiple times a year. Often these measures require the 
involvement of outside agencies. They are classified as low-frequency measures (Caballero, 
2017) and are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Internal Security Audit 
A security audit of an institution's information security infrastructure and policies may be 
conducted by the internal audit unit of the institution to identify areas where improvement is 
needed. Some institutions have dedicated internal audit teams that conduct such procedures 
routinely. Because such audits are completed by employees of the institution, there are no extra 
costs associated with the process, and there is no additional risk of institutional data being 
exposed to a third-party (Steinbart, Raschke, Gal, & Dilla, 2012). Some higher education 
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institutions often allow students enrolled in a computer security class at the institution to perform 
an internal security audit for the institution as a part of their coursework (Stetson University, 
2018).  
External security Audit 
A security audit of an institution's information security infrastructure and policies may be 
conducted by an external independent agency to rectify shortcomings and identify areas of 
improvement. These audits are typically carried out by experts in their fields. Consequently, 
there is a significant cost associated with this process. Specialized tools and software are often 
used for external audits. Because they are conducted by people outside the institution, internal 
biases are avoided (Kovacich & Halibozek, 2017). 
Review of Institutional Security Policies and Change Management Policies 
Information security is a dynamic field. As security threats change and become more 
sophisticated, an institution's security policies and change management policies also need to 
change to keep up. Therefore, institutional security policies and change management policies 
need to be reviewed periodically to ensure that they are updated with the necessary changes (Adi, 
Hamza, & Pene, 2018).  
Attendance of Information Technology Personnel at Information Security Classes 
Staff working in information security areas can be more productive and efficient if they 
can enhance their skills and knowledge by attending information security classes. Some of these 
classes prepare security personnel with the concepts of ethical hacking that allow them to 
enhance their skills in tackling security threats more efficiently (Caballero, 2017). 
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Mandatory Training on Security Topics for all Employees 
Threats to information security change constantly. Adequate training on a regular basis 
can keep institutional staff updated about the latest threats and applicable safeguards so that they 
can implement those in practice. There is never a substitute for relevant training. An institution 
that regularly trains its staff, especially on security aspects, is usually well-prepared to tackle the 
ever-changing security threats. If such trainings are made mandatory and routinely enforced, an 
institution can ensure that none of its staff are left behind in any area related to threats and 
safeguards (Caldwell, 2016) 
Review of Data Breach Remediation Procedures 
Breach remediation procedures that include cyber insurance policies, post-breach actions 
need to be reviewed by the institutions periodically to keep them up to date (Young et al., 2016). 
Review of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Policies 
Data breaches, unauthorized access, malware or natural disasters can affect an 
institution's business continuity. In cases of technical or natural disasters, an institution needs to 
have plans in place to recover from any disruption of service quickly and resume normal 
operations efficiently. These business continuity and disaster recovery plans need to be reviewed 
periodically to ensure accuracy, reliability, and adaptability (Snedaker & Rima, 2014). 
Review of Data Backup Policies 
An efficient data backup policy is essential for data security. A backup is the last defense 
against data loss, providing a way to restore original data. This data policy is expected to be 
reviewed periodically to ensure that data are backed up optimally while considering advanced 
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methods of data backup to enhance efficiency in creating backups and restoring from them 
(Cherry, 2015). 
Budget Allocations for Information Security 
In recent years, especially after the economic downturn towards the end of the last 
decade, almost all states in the United States had to endure budget cuts, especially in the field of 
education (Serneels, Beegle, & Dillon, 2017). This, in turn, has negatively impacted the ability of 
educational institutions to implement sophisticated information security related initiatives. 
Budgets allocated for information security in educational institutions form a part of the total 
budget for information technology initiatives which experienced cuts due to the overall 
budgetary situation of education in general. Private institutions that did not typically rely on state 
funding, but were instead funded by revenue generated from enrollments, were also negatively 
impacted due to the economic downturn which caused lower enrollments in such institutions 
(Urquiola, 2016). However, with the relative stabilization of the economy in recent years, 
enrollments in private institutions have increased (Serneels et al., 2017).  
Information technology (IT) budgets are typically allocated as a function of the total 
operating budget of an institution which, in turn, is related to its revenue and size. Interestingly, 
the allocation of funds for information technology has been higher for smaller institutions. 
According to a recent 2018 publication, the average small institution (less than $50 million in 
revenue) spends 6.9% of their revenue on IT; Mid-sized institutions (between $50 million – $2 
billion) spend 4.1%, while larger institutions (over $2 billion) spend a relatively tiny 3.2%. The 
relatively smaller allocation in larger institutions is probably related to economies of scale 
obtained from operational efficiencies (How Much Should a Company Spend on IT?/Business 
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Guide, 2018). Institutions spend on an average 5.6% of the overall IT budget on information 
security and risk management with a range of 1% to 13% (Gartner Says Many Organizations 
Falsely Equate IT Security Spending with Maturity, 2016). 
In recent years, a majority of proposed and enacted budget proposals at both the state and 
federal levels have curtailed budgets allocated for the fields of education. Technology and 
personnel budgets have thus been impacted across most educational institutions. Although some 
premier higher education institutions have used donor, endowment and grant money to power 
technology initiatives, the impact on state run public schools due to the budget cuts has been the 
most significant (Kelly & Rohland, 2017). Often, schools have no dedicated full-time personnel 
allocated for information technology and security areas. Those who oversee those areas have 
other responsibilities as well. In a specialized area such as information security, a lack of 
specialization has had detrimental effects (Fay & Patterson, 2018). 
Critical issues like teacher shortages and school closures have affected education at its 
very core. Areas like information security, although serious, have not historically ranked very 
high in the list of priorities for educational institutions and are facing continuous challenges. In 
such an environment, keeping up with constant changes in the field of information security for 
educational institutions dealing with budget cuts has been increasingly difficult (Furnell et al., 
2017).  
Summary 
Information security is a dynamic concept. Threat mitigation mechanisms that were 
prevalent and effective in the past may not be valid today as the threats themselves constantly 
change. To keep up in this dynamic environment, educational institutions need to constantly 
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evaluate their existing security practices and make necessary enhancements as needed to protect 
their confidential information, which includes the personal identity information (PII) of their 
users. Adequate infrastructure, personnel, and budgetary support are necessary for educational 
institutions to achieve this objective, but they lag behind industrial enterprises in this regard. 
Moreover, infrastructure, personnel, and budgetary differences may exist between the types of 
educational institutions. A review of relevant literature pertaining to information security in 
educational institutions showed a dearth of research pertaining to the preparedness of educational 
institutions to handle data security threats and any associated research comparing information 
security practices and preparedness across different types of educational institutions. Thus, this 
chapter focused on research of attributes necessary to conduct such a comparative analysis of 
different types of educational institutions with respect to their information security preparedness. 
The information obtained was instrumental in designing the Information Security Preparedness 
Instrument (ISPI©) that was created and used exclusively for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The primary goal of this study was to investigate the research questions that relate to the 
preparedness of educational institutions toward ensuring the security of their institutional 
information as stated in Chapter 1. A survey instrument titled Information Security Preparedness 
Instrument (ISPI©) was created exclusively for this study by the researcher. An online survey 
tool named Qualtrics was used to distribute the survey instrument and obtain the data for the 
study. The methodology used to investigate the research questions is presented in this chapter 
which has been organized into five sections: (a) research questions, (b) selection of participants, 
(c) instrumentation, (d) data collection and, (e) data analysis.  
Research Questions 
The following research questions were used to guide this study: 
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security 
among educational institutions with respect to identification and classification 
of threats, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?  
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five 
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): 
1.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
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1.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
software-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
data-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
people-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security 
among educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, 
frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary 
allocation, and how do results vary across the types of institutions? 
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five 
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical 
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation: 
2.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
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2.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
software-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
data-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
people-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.6 What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of 
high-frequency critical practices among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.7. What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of 
low-frequency critical practices and security policy updates among the 
different types of educational institutions? 
2.8. What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to 
information security among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
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3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational 
institutions with respect to information security, and how do results vary 
across the types of institutions? 
Selection of Participants 
 The population of interest for this study consisted of a cross-sectional representation of 
the following types of educational institutions in the state of Florida: public and private PK-12 
institutions, public and private universities, and virtual schools. Because the threat to institutional 
data applies to all educational institutions, a representation of different types of educational 
institutions was necessary for an accurate analysis, as they are subjected to different levels of 
constraints with respect to ensuring information security.  
The information systems in PK-12 Public Schools in Florida are managed at the school-
district level. There are 67 school districts in Florida, one for each county. Each of the 67 school 
districts operate virtual schools (Virtual Education, 2018). In addition, there is a state-run Florida 
Virtual School along with several virtual schools both tuition free and private that are not 
operated by the state (Online Learning with a K12 Education, 2018). There are also 3,072 PK-12 
Private Schools that operate in Florida (Private School Directory, 2018). Finally, there are 85 
Public Colleges/Universities and 57 Private Colleges/Universities in the state (Florida Colleges 
and Universities – Colleges Search by State/Cappex, 2018).    
The criterion for selection of the participant institutions for the study was the online 
availability of contact information of their respective heads of information technology. The 
contact information for the heads of information technology for PK-12 Public Schools was 
available online for all 67 school districts. Similarly, the contact information for the heads of 
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information technology for PK-12 Virtual Schools was available online for all 67 school 
districts, the Florida Virtual School, and two non-state-run virtual schools, thereby totaling 70 
virtual schools. The numbers of PK-12 Private Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, and Private 
Colleges/Universities for which the contact information for the heads of information technology 
was available online were 20, 30, and 30 respectively. Thus, using a method of criterion-based 
purposive sampling, a total of 218 institutions were chosen for the study.  
A researcher-created survey, Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), was 
used for this study. Emails containing a link to this researcher-created survey were sent in March 
2018 to the respective heads of information technology at the 218 selected educational 
institutions.  
Data Collection 
Approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Central Florida. The approval can be seen in Appendix A. The data for this study were obtained 
from the respondents using a survey instrument titled Information Security Preparedness 
Instrument (ISPI©) which was based on the Qualtrix Survey tool and created exclusively for this 
study by the researcher (See Appendix B). This 68-question online survey was designed to take 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Given the nature of the questions involved regarding 
institutional information security and to protect the confidentiality of the respondents, the survey 
was designed to be anonymous. The researcher provided all respondents involved in the study 
with an informed consent form (Appendix D), which includes a clause stating that the participant 
can withdraw from the study at any time. The consent form was added as an attachment to the 
email that was sent to the respondents. The email briefly explained the research study being 
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conducted and provided the respondent with a choice to participate and a link to access the web-
based ISPI© instrument. Prior to beginning the instrument, the respondents were asked to 
confirm their consent to take part in this study. They had to agree to participate in the ISPI© 
instrument before being able to begin. 
Web-based surveys are a convenient and popular method of data collection, especially if 
they are directed toward an internet-savvy population. However, a “survey-overload” is often 
created as many research initiatives and other data collection initiatives use this method. 
Consequently, the response rate for such surveys has declined over the years (Morton et al, 
2012). Nulty (2008) in comparing response rates to online surveys showed that they can range 
anywhere from 20% to 47%. Another publication indicated that web-based response rates for 
surveys are usually around 42% (Dilman, Smyth & Christian, 2014). Bennett and Nair (2009) 
contended, however, that there is no magic formula by which a response rate can be identified as 
“acceptable.” Furthermore, there is no evidence that online surveys with lower response rates 
produce biased evaluations (Layne, DeCristoforo, & McGinty, 1999; Porter, 2004). Although a 
higher response rate is certainly desirable, valid and reliable results have been generated from 
online surveys with low response rates of 30% (Bennett & Nair, 2009). 
This study was exploratory in nature. The selected sample was not expected to be 
representative of the population of interest, and thus findings were not immediately 
generalizable, though some cautious generalizations were inferred and are presented. The 
researcher was attentive to recommended minimums to achieve a reliable and valid result and 
attempted to obtain a survey response rate of at least 42% (Dilman et al., 2014). 
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The initial email to the respondents was sent on March 7, 2018. The survey was available 
to complete from March 7, 2018 through March 31, 2018. Two follow-up emails were sent prior 
to the survey closing date to remind respondents to complete it. Of the 218 institutional 
respondents who were contacted, 93 responded. Thus, the survey had an overall response rate of 
42.66%. 
Data Analysis 
Data Analysis for Research Question 1 
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale 
of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 being the riskiest as they applied to their respective 
institutions. The data obtained for the threats was aggregated to the level of the five factors of 
information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was 
calculated for individual items within each of the five factor groups). The association of the 
selected security threats and the five factors of information systems is shown in Table 2. Any 
given security risk may be associated with more than one information security factors. However, 
for this study, any given risk was classified only under one factor based on the one on which it 
had the maximum impact. 
Responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was 
calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of 
institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to 
ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of institution level. Five 
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separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat perceptions across the 
different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The dependent 
variables were the security threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information 
systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedure) and the independent variable was the 
institution type. 
 
Table 2 
  
Association of Security Risks with Five Factors of Information Systems 
  
Risk Factor 
Ransomware Software 
Cyber – espionage Data 
Phishing People 
Sniffing Hardware 
Hacking Procedure 
Denial of service Procedure 
Natural disasters Hardware 
Theft Hardware 
Improper disposal People 
Malicious insider People 
Spoofing Procedure 
Malware Software 
SQL injection Software 
Web application attacks Software 
Payment card skimmers Hardware 
Weak passwords People 
Elevation of privilege Procedure 
User errors People 
Unpatched systems Data 
Institutional data on personal devices Data 
Unencrypted data transfers Data 
Institutional data on third party services Data 
Outdated anti-virus and anti-malware software Software 
Inadequate security monitoring Procedure 
Inadequate backups of institutional data Procedure 
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Data Analysis for Research Question 2 
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention 
measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective and 5 being the most effective as they 
applied to their respective institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to indicate on the ISPI© 
instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions performed critical security 
practices and reviewed their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining 
the institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to 
prevent breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about 
their institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds, and the reporting lines 
of the head of information technology for this purpose. 
The data obtained for the threat prevention measures were aggregated to the level of the 
five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the 
group mean was calculated for individual items within each of the five factor groups). The 
association of the selected threat prevention measures and the five factors of information systems 
is shown in Table 3. Any given security risk may be associated with more than one information 
security factor. However, for this study, only the primary factor was associated. 
Responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was 
calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the different types of 
institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to 
ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of institution level. Five 
separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat prevention measures 
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across the different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The 
dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level of the five 
factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and the 
independent variable was the institution type.  
 
Table 3  
 
Association of Threat Prevention Measures with Five Factors of Information Systems 
Risk Factor 
Instructing users to not click on links in emails from unknown 
sources 
People 
Instructing users to not open attachments from emails from 
unknown sources 
People 
Instructing users to avoid visiting unauthorized websites on 
work computers 
People 
Implementing a password policy for strong, complex and long 
passwords for all users 
Procedure 
Making users change passwords frequently Procedure 
Avoiding sending valuable and confidential data via email or 
instant messages 
People 
Instructing users to check for https in any website address that 
require authentication 
People 
Removing stored personal identifying information from 
computers and mobile devices 
Hardware 
Clearing browsing history, temporary files and cookies from 
public computers 
Software 
Regularly updating anti-virus and anti-malware software on all 
institutional machines 
Software 
Taking regular backups of key data Procedure 
Using central authentication and single sign on Data 
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Risk Factor 
Using multi-factor authentication Data 
Using encryption for data transfer and storage Data 
Using biometric authentication for accessing secure areas Hardware 
User authorization Data 
Employing a dedicated Information Security Officer People 
Installing institutional firewall Software 
Installing institutional virtual private network Software 
Training users on new security threats People 
Implementing post-intrusion attempt remediation procedures Procedure 
Applying critical server and system patches regularly Procedure 
 
 
 
The responses about frequencies of critical security practices and security policy updates 
were first differentiated between high frequency and low frequency based on their relative 
frequency of occurrence. Practices that are typically undertaken multiple times a year were 
classified as high frequency practices and those that were performed yearly or less frequently 
were classified as low frequency practices. These practices are listed in Table 4. The responses 
were then grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain 
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The data were analyzed using descriptive 
statistics and two ANOVA procedures, one each for high frequency and low frequency practices 
to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. For the ANOVA procedures, 
the dependent variables were the frequencies of critical security practices and security policy 
updates and the independent variable was the institution type.  
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Table 4  
 
Typical Frequencies of Critical Security Practices 
Measure Frequency 
Honey pot experiments High 
Social engineering experiments to enforce security protocols High 
Log review and monitoring High 
Internal security audit Low 
External security audit Low 
Review of institutional security policies and change 
management 
Low 
Sending information technology personnel to attend 
information security classes 
Low 
Mandatory training on security topics for all employees Low 
Review of data breach remediation procedures Low 
Review of business continuity and disaster recovery policies Low 
Review of data backup policies Low 
 
Note. High = Multiple times a year, Low = Yearly or less frequent 
 
Finally, the responses obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation metrics 
were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain 
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The budget allocation metrics are listed in 
Table 5. The analysis of the data was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the 
overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to 
compare budget allocations for information security across the different types of educational 
institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations and the independent variable was 
the institution type.  
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Table 5  
 
Budget Allocation Metrics 
Budget Measure Score 
Percentage of Annual Operating Budget allocated to Information 
Technology (IT) 
 
Less than 3% 1 
3% to 10% 2 
10% to 15% 3 
Greater than 15% 4 
  
Percentage of IT Budget allocated to Information Security  
Less than 3% 1 
3% to 10% 2 
10% to 15% 3 
Greater than 15% 4 
  
Dollar Amount of IT Budget per Employee  
Less than $5,000 1 
$5,000 to $10,000 2 
$10,000 to $20,000 3 
Greater than $20,000 4 
 
Data Analysis for Research Question 3 
  To answer Research Question 3, respondents were asked to rank their overall information 
security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most 
prepared. The responses obtained from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group 
mean was calculated by institution type to obtain response profiles for the different types of 
institutions). The analysis of the data was completed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the 
overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to 
compare the overall security preparation scores across the different types of educational 
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institutions. The dependent variable was the self-reported information security preparedness 
level and the independent variable was the institution type. 
 
Ancillary Data Analyses  
 Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze the initial findings related to the 
research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study. 
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a N/A response analysis. 
The correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI© to 
investigate how each of the mean scores of security threat risk perception factors, threat 
prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, frequency of key security practices, and 
budget allocations correlated with the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution 
who participated in the survey. The purpose of this analysis was to further investigate the factors 
to determine which had the most impact on the overall institutional threat preparedness. 
 Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it 
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score, 
or a frequency of a key security measure. An N/A response meant that the item concerned did 
not apply to the institution concerned. In other words, the institution concerned did not 
implement the item concerned as a threat prevention measure or did not consider the item 
concerned as a significant risk. An analysis was completed to identify the 10 items on the ISPI© 
that had the most N/A responses and how such N/A responses were distributed across the 
different types of educational institutions. The averages of the percentage distributions of the 
identified N/A response items were then calculated for each type of educational institution. The 
 76 
purpose of this analysis was to help identify how the N/A responses were distributed across the 
types of educational institutions which, in turn, helped identify the types of educational 
institutions that were failing to implement key security measures the most. 
Summary 
The methods used to conduct this study have been presented in this chapter. The purpose 
of the study and the research questions were restated. The selection of participants, 
instrumentation, data collection, and data analysis were also presented. Results of the data 
analysis are presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
 This exploratory study was conducted to analyze the preparedness of educational 
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported 
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices. 
Factors that were studied with reference to securing institutional data were aligned with the five 
components of any information system (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data, 
procedures, and people. The researcher examined the security threats and the critical measures 
associated with these factors that can enhance security within the constraints applicable to 
educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the threats to information security, the 
researcher further explored the frequencies with which the different types of educational 
institutions undertake critical security practices and stay up-to-date in their information security 
policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of educational institutions with respect to 
implementing information security measures as reflected in their allocation of budgets for the 
same was explored. This chapter presents the data for the three research questions and is divided 
into three sections: (a) Data Collection Response Details, (b) Results, and (c) Summary. 
Data Collection Response Details 
 A researcher-created survey named Information Security Preparedness Instrument 
(ISPI©) was used in this study. Emails containing a link to this researcher-created survey were 
sent on March 7, 2018 to individuals overseeing information security at 218 educational 
institutions. Institutions included 20 PK-12 Private Schools, 30 Public Colleges or Universities, 
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30 Private Colleges or Universities, the Florida Virtual School, 70 PK-12 Virtual Schools, and 
all 67 PK-12 Public School districts. The survey remained open through March 31, 2018. A total 
of 93 responses were received, 31 of which were from PK-12 Public Schools, 10 were from PK-
12 Private Schools, 17 were from PK-12 Virtual Schools, 20 were from Public Colleges or 
Universities and 15 were from Private Colleges or Universities. The response rate was the 
highest for Public Colleges or Universities at 66.66% and was the lowest for PK-12 Virtual 
Schools at 24.28%. The overall response rate was 42.66%.  
Results 
Research Question 1 
What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among educational 
institutions with respect to identification and classification of threats, and how do results vary 
across the types of institutions? 
The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain 
the overall response profiles at the factor level and at the type of institution level. Five separate 
one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat perceptions across the different 
types of educational institutions, one for each dependent variable. The dependent variables were 
the security threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware, 
software, data, people, and procedures), and the independent variable was the institution type. 
The research question was further divided into five sub-questions, one for each dependent 
variable. The analyses to respond to the five sub-questions for Research Question 1 are presented 
in the sections. 
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Research Question 1.1. Hardware-Oriented Threats 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for hardware-oriented threats 
among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 6. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of security risks for hardware-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for hardware-oriented threats across all types of 
educational institutions was 3.52. PK-12 Public Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.62 
and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.10. The risk score varied the 
most among PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.71 
and varied the least among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.45.  
 
Table 6  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Hardware-Oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.62 0.71 [3.36, 3.88] 1.25 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.10 0.61 [2.66, 3.54] 2.25 3.75 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.69 0.71 [3.33, 4.06] 2.00 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.43 0.45 [3.21, 3.64] 2.50 4.25 
Private College/University 15 3.52 0.41 [3.29, 3.74] 2.75 4.00 
Total 93 3.52 0.62 [3.39, 3.65] 1.25 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perception of 
hardware-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 7). The results from the analysis 
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions 
with respect to hardware-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.85, p = 
0.13]. 
Table 7  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.76 4 0.69 1.85 0.13 
Within Groups 32.74 88 0.37   
Total 35.50 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
Research Question 1.2. Software-Oriented Threats 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for software-oriented threats 
among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 8. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of security risks for software-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being the least risky and 5 
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for software-oriented threats across all types of 
educational institutions was 3.56. PK-12 Virtual Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.69, 
and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.28. The risk score varied the 
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most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.64 and varied the least among 
Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.42.  
 
Table 8  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Software-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.63 0.53 [3.43, 3.82] 2.80 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.28 0.54 [2.89, 3.66] 2.40 4.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.69 0.64 [3.36, 4.02] 2.60 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.45 0.50 [3.21, 3.68] 2.40 4.20 
Private College/University 15 3.63 0.42 [3.39, 3.85] 3.00 4.40 
Total 93 3.56 0.54 [3.45, 3.67] 2.40 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
software-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 9). The results from the analysis 
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions 
with respect to software-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.35, p = 
0.26].  
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Table 9  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Software-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.53 4 0.38 1.35 0.26 
Within Groups 24.94 88 0.28   
Total 26.48 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
Research Question 1.3. Data-Oriented Threats 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for data-oriented threats among 
the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 10. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of security risks for data-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for data-oriented threats across all types of educational 
institutions was 3.79. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean risk score of 3.89, and 
PK-12 Public Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.74. The risk score varied the most 
among PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.66 and varied the least among 
Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.38.  
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Table 10  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Data-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.74 0.66 [3.50, 3.98] 1.80 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.86 0.57 [3.44, 4.27] 2.40 4.40 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.80 0.64 [3.47, 4.12] 2.20 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.76 0.40 [3.57, 3.94] 2.60 4.40 
Private College/University 15 3.89 0.38 [3.68, 4.10] 3.40 4.80 
Total 93 3.79 0.55 [3.68, 3.90] 1.80 5.00 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of data-
oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 11). The results of the analysis revealed that 
there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions with respect to 
data-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 0.24, p = 0.92].   
 
Table 11  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Data-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 0.30 4 0.08 0.24 0.92 
Within Groups 27.58 88 0.31   
Total 27.88 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
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Research Question 1.4. Procedure-Oriented Threats 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for procedure-oriented threats 
among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 12. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of security risks for procedure-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for procedure-oriented threats across all types of 
educational institutions was 3.67. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean risk score 
of 3.78 and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.45. The risk score varied 
the most among PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.76 and varied the least 
among Private Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.27.  
 
Table 12  
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.68 0.76 [3.40, 3.96] 1.25 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.45 0.50 [3.09, 3.80] 2.50 4.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.76 0.58 [3.45, 4.05] 2.67 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.60 0.38 [3.42, 3.77] 2.67 4.00 
Private College/University 15 3.78 0.27 [3.62, 3.92] 3.17 4.17 
Total 93 3.67 0.57 [3.55, 3.78] 1.25 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
procedure-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 13). The results from the analysis 
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions 
with respect to procedure-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 0.68, p = 
0.61].   
 
Table 13  
ANOVA: Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 0.89 4 0.22 0.68 0.61 
Within Groups 28.77 88 0.33   
Total 29.66 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
Research Question 1.5. People-Oriented Threats 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for people-oriented threats 
among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 14. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of security risks for people-oriented threats on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least risky and 5 
being the riskiest. The mean risk score for people-oriented threats across all types of educational 
institutions was 3.80. PK-12 Virtual Schools had the highest mean risk score of 3.99, and PK-12 
Private Schools had the lowest mean risk score of 3.54. The risk score varied the most among 
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PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 0.58 and varied the least among Private 
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.31.  
 
Table 14  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of People-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.76 0.58 [3.55, 3.97] 2.20 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.54 0.47 [3.20, 3.87] 2.60 4.20 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.99 0.53 [3.71, 4.26] 3.00 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.79 0.35 [3.62, 3.95] 3.20 4.40 
Private College/University 15 3.83 0.31 [3.65, 3.99] 3.40 4.20 
Total 93 3.80 0.48 [3.69, 3.89] 2.20 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
people-oriented threats among institutional types (see Table 15). The results from the analysis 
revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among the types of institutions 
with respect to people-oriented threat perceptions at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.46, p = 
0.22].   
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Table 15  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of People-oriented Threats by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.34 4 0.33 1.46 0.22 
Within Groups 20.10 88 0.23   
Total 21.44 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
Research Question 2 
What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security among educational 
institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, frequency of critical practices and security 
policy updates, and budgetary allocation, and how do results vary across the types of 
institutions? 
The analysis of the data collected for threat prevention measures was a combination of 
descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and at the type of 
institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat 
prevention measures across the different types of educational institutions, one for each dependent 
variable. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level of 
the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures) and 
the independent variable was the institution type.  
The data for frequency of key security practices were analyzed using descriptive statistics 
and two separate one-way ANOVA procedures, one each for high frequency and low frequency 
practices to ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. For both the ANOVA 
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procedures, the dependent variables were the frequencies of critical security practices and 
security policy updates; and the independent variable was the institution type. 
The analysis of the data collected for budget allocation was completed using descriptive 
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA 
procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for information security across the 
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations, 
and the independent variable was the institution type.  
The research question was further divided into eight sub-questions, one for each 
dependent variable. The analyses to respond to the eight sub-questions for Research Question 2 
are presented in this section. 
Research Question 2.1. Hardware-Oriented Measures 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of hardware-oriented 
security measures among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 16. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of effectiveness for hardware-oriented security measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least 
effective and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for hardware-oriented 
measures across all types of educational institutions was 3.19. Private Colleges/Universities had 
the highest mean effectiveness score of 3.80, and PK-12 Private Schools had the lowest mean 
effectiveness score of 2.85. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual 
Schools with a standard deviation of 1.00 and varied the least among Private 
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.53.  
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Table 16  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type  
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.03 0.71 [2.77, 3.29] 1.00 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 2.85 0.58 [2.43, 3.26] 2.00 4.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 16 2.94 1.00 [2.40, 3.46] 1.00 5.00 
Public College/University 20 3.35 0.65 [3.04, 3.65] 2.00 5.00 
Private College/University 15 3.80 0.53 [3.50, 4.09] 3.00 4.50 
Total 92 3.19 0.77 [3.03, 3.34] 1.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
effectiveness of hardware-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 17). The 
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of 
institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of hardware-oriented measures at the 
p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 4.38, p = 0.00]. 
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Table 17  
ANOVA: Perceptions of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 9.04 4 2.26 4.38 0.00 
Within Groups 44.88 87 0.52   
Total 53.92 91    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of hardware-oriented measures 
(see Table 18). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private 
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Public Schools, Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 
Private Schools, and Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools. 
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Table 18  
 
Tukey HSD Post-hoc Test of Scores of Hardware-oriented Measures by Institution Type  
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School 0.18 0.26 0.96 [-0.54, 0.90] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.09 0.22 0.99 [-0.52, 0.71] 
Public College/University -0.32 0.21 0.54 [-0.89, 0.25] 
Private College/University -0.77 0.23 0.01 [-1.39, -0.13] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School -0.18 0.26 0.96 [-0.90, 0.54] 
PK-12 Virtual School -0.09 0.29 1.00 [-0.89, 0.71] 
Public College/University -0.50 0.28 0.38 [-1.27, 0.27] 
Private College/University -0.95 0.29 0.01 [-1.76, -0.13] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.09 0.22 0.99 [-0.71, 0.52] 
PK-12 Private School 0.09 0.29 1.00 [-0.71, 0.89] 
Public College/University -0.41 0.24 0.43 [-1.08, 0.25] 
Private College/University -0.86 0.26 0.01 [-1.58, -0.14] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.32 0.21 0.54 [-0.25, 0.89] 
PK-12 Private School 0.50 0.28 0.38 [-0.27, 1.27] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.41 0.24 0.43 [-0.25, 1.08] 
Private College/University -0.45 0.25 0.36 [-1.13, 0.23] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.77 0.23 0.01 [0.13, 1.39] 
PK-12 Private School 0.95 0.29 0.01 [0.13, 1.76] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.86 0.26 0.01 [0.14, 1.58] 
Public College/University 0.45 0.25 0.36 [-0.23, 1.13] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
 
 
Research Question 2.2. Software-Oriented Measures 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of software-oriented security 
measures among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 19. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of effectiveness for software-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective 
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for software-oriented measures 
across all types of educational institutions was 3.43. Public Colleges/Universities had the highest 
mean effectiveness score of 3.63, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness 
score of 3.11. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a 
standard deviation of 0.69 and varied the least among Private Colleges/Universities with a 
standard deviation of 0.40.  
 
Table 19  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.42 0.41 [3.26, 3.56] 2.67 4.25 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.33 0.47 [2.98, 3.66] 2.75 4.25 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.11 0.69 [2.75, 3.46] 1.00 4.00 
Public College/University 20 3.63 0.41 [3.43, 3.81] 3.00 5.00 
Private College/University 15 3.62 0.40 [3.39, 3.83] 2.50 4.00 
Total 93 3.43 0.50 [3.32, 3.53] 1.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
effectiveness of software-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 20). The results 
from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions 
 93 
with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of software-oriented measures at the p < 0.05 
level [F(4, 88) = 3.47, p = 0.01]. 
 
Table 20  
ANOVA: Perceptions of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type  
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.17 4 0.79 3.47 0.01 
Within Groups 20.06 88 0.23   
Total 23.22 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of software-oriented measures 
(see Table 21). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private 
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools and between Public Colleges/Universities and 
PK-12 Virtual Schools. 
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Table 21  
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Software-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School 0.09 0.17 0.98 [-0.39, 0.57] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.31 0.14 0.21 [-0.09, 0.71] 
Public College/University -0.21 0.14 0.55 [-0.58, 0.17] 
Private College/University -0.20 0.15 0.67 [-0.61, 0.21] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School -0.09 0.17 0.98 [-0.57, 0.39] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.22 0.19 0.78 [-0.31, 0.74] 
Public College/University -0.30 0.18 0.49 [-0.81, 0.21] 
Private College/University -0.29 0.19 0.57 [-0.83, 0.25] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.31 0.14 0.21 [-0.71, 0.09] 
PK-12 Private School -0.22 0.19 0.78 [-0.74, 0.31] 
Public College/University -0.52 0.16 0.01 [-0.95, -0.07] 
Private College/University -0.51 0.17 0.03 [-0.98, -0.03] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.21 0.14 0.55 [-0.17, 0.58] 
PK-12 Private School 0.30 0.18 0.49 [-0.21, 0.81] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.52 0.16 0.01 [0.07, 0.95] 
Private College/University 0.01 0.16 1.00 [-0.44, 0.46] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.20 0.15 0.67 [-0.21, 0.61] 
PK-12 Private School 0.29 0.19 0.57 [-0.25, 0.83] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.51 0.17 0.03 [0.03, 0.98] 
Public College/University -0.01 0.16 1.00 [-0.46, 0.44] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
Research Question 2.3. Data-Oriented Measures 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of data-oriented security 
measures among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 22. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of effectiveness for data-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective and 
5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for data-oriented measures across all 
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types of educational institutions was 4.01. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean 
effectiveness score of 4.39, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness score 
of 3.55. The effectiveness scores varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard 
deviation of 1.06 and varied the least among Private Colleges/Universities with a standard 
deviation of 0.34.  
 
Table 22  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.84 0.62 [3.60, 4.06] 3.00 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.98 0.56 [3.57, 4.37] 2.50 4.67 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.55 1.06 [3.00, 4.10] 1.00 5.00 
Public College/University 20 4.38 0.40 [4.19, 4.57] 3.67 5.00 
Private College/University 15 4.39 0.34 [4.20, 4.57] 3.75 4.75 
Total 93 4.01 0.71 [3.86, 4.15] 1.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
effectiveness of data-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 23). The results 
from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions 
with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of data-oriented measures at the p < 0.05 level 
[F(4, 88) = 5.59, p = 0.00]. 
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Table 23  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 9.42 4 2.36 5.59 0.00 
Within Groups 37.06 88 0.42   
Total 46.48 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of data-oriented measures (see 
Table 24). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private 
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools, between Public Colleges/Universities and PK-
12 Virtual Schools, and between PK-12 Public Schools and Public Colleges/Universities. 
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Table 24  
 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Data-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.14 0.24 0.98 [-0.79, 0.51] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.28 0.20 0.60 [-0.26, 0.82] 
Public College/University -0.55 0.19 0.03 [-1.06, -0.02] 
Private College/University -0.55 0.20 0.06 [-1.12, 0.01] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.14 0.24 0.98 [-0.51, 0.79] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.42 0.26 0.48 [-0.29, 1.14] 
Public College/University -0.41 0.25 0.49 [-1.10, 0.29] 
Private College/University -0.41 0.26 0.53 [-1.15, 0.32] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.28 0.20 0.60 [-0.82, 0.26] 
PK-12 Private School -0.42 0.26 0.48 [-1.14, 0.29] 
Public College/University -0.83 0.21 0.00 [-1.42, -0.23] 
Private College/University -0.83 0.23 0.00 [-1.47, -0.19] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.55 0.19 0.03 [0.02, 1.06] 
PK-12 Private School 0.41 0.25 0.49 [-0.29, 1.10] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.83 0.21 0.00 [0.23, 1.42] 
Private College/University -0.01 0.22 1.00 [-0.62, 0.61] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.55 0.20 0.06 [-0.01, 1.12] 
PK-12 Private School 0.41 0.26 0.53 [-0.32, 1.15] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.83 0.23 0.00 [0.19, 1.47] 
Public College/University 0.01 0.22 1.00 [-0.61, 0.62] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
 
 
Research Question 2.4. Procedure-oriented Measures 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of procedure-oriented 
security measures among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 25. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of effectiveness for procedure-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective 
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for procedure-oriented measures 
across all types of educational institutions was 3.70. Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 
Private Schools had the highest mean effectiveness score of 3.96, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had 
the lowest mean effectiveness score of 3.41. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-
12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.82 and varied the least among Public 
Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.33.  
 
Table 25  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 3.61 0.42 [3.45, 3.76] 3.00 4.40 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.96 0.44 [3.64, 4.27] 3.40 5.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 3.41 0.82 [2.99, 3.83] 1.00 4.40 
Public College/University 20 3.77 0.33 [3.61, 3.92] 3.00 4.40 
Private College/University 15 3.96 0.44 [3.71, 4.20] 3.40 4.80 
Total 93 3.70 0.53 [3.59, 3.81] 1.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 26). The 
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of 
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institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures at the 
p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 3.37, p = 0.01]. 
 
Table 26  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.45 4 0.86 3.37 0.01 
Within Groups 22.57 88 0.26   
Total 26.03 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their perceptions of procedure-oriented measures 
(see Table 27). Based on the results, statistically significant differences existed between Private 
Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools. 
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Table 27  
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Procedure-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.35 0.18 0.32 [-0.86, 0.16] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.20 0.15 0.70 [-0.22, 0.62] 
Public College/University -0.16 0.15 0.80 [-0.56, 0.24] 
Private College/University -0.35 0.16 0.19 [-0.79, 0.09] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.35 0.18 0.32 [-0.16, 0.86] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.55 0.20 0.06 [-0.01, 1.11] 
Public College/University 0.19 0.20 0.87 [-0.35, 0.73] 
Private College/University 0.00 0.21 1.00 [-0.57, 0.57] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.20 0.15 0.70 [-0.62, 0.22] 
PK-12 Private School -0.55 0.20 0.06 [-1.11, 0.01] 
Public College/University -0.36 0.17 0.21 [-0.82, 0.10] 
Private College/University -0.55 0.18 0.02 [-1.04, -0.04] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.16 0.15 0.80 [-0.24, 0.56] 
PK-12 Private School -0.19 0.20 0.87 [-0.73, 0.35] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.36 0.17 0.21 [-0.10, 0.82] 
Private College/University -0.19 0.17 0.81 [-0.67, 0.29] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.35 0.16 0.19 [-0.09, 0.79] 
PK-12 Private School 0.00 0.21 1.00 [-0.57, 0.57] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.55 0.18 0.02 [0.04, 1.04] 
Public College/University 0.19 0.17 0.81 [-0.29, 0.67] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
Research Question 2.5. People-Oriented Measures 
What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of people-oriented security 
measures among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 28. The respondents rated their perceptions 
of effectiveness for people-oriented measures on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least effective 
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and 5 being the most effective. The mean effectiveness score for people-oriented measures 
across all types of educational institutions was 3.06. PK-12 Private Schools had the highest mean 
effectiveness score of 3.306, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean effectiveness score 
of 2.97. The effectiveness score varied the most among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard 
deviation of 0.68 and varied the least among PK-12 Private Schools with a standard deviation of 
0.41. 
 
Table 28  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of People-oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 2.99 0.46 [2.81, 3.15] 2.00 4.14 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.30 0.41 [3.00, 3.58] 2.57 3.71 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 2.97 0.68 [2.62, 3.31] 1.00 4.00 
Public College/University 20 3.03 0.58 [2.75, 3.30] 2.29 4.29 
Private College/University 15 3.20 0.52 [2.91, 3.49] 2.14 4.14 
Total 93 3.06 0.54 [2.95, 3.17] 1.00 4.29 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the perceptions of 
effectiveness of procedure-oriented measures among institutional types (see Table 29). The 
results from the analysis revealed that there were no statistically significant differences among 
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the types of institutions with respect to the perceptions of effectiveness of people-oriented 
measures at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 1.02, p = 0.40]. 
 
Table 29  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of People-Oriented Measures by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.18 4 0.29 1.02 0.40 
Within Groups 25.39 88 0.29   
Total 26.57 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
Research Question 2.6. High Frequency Practices 
What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of high-frequency critical 
practices among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 30. The respondents indicated the 
frequencies with which they performed critical security practices. For practices that were 
typically performed multiple times a year, the responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1 
being the least frequent and 5 being the most frequent. The mean score for high frequency 
practices across all types of educational institutions was 1.24. Private Colleges/Universities had 
the highest mean score of 3.24, and PK-12 Virtual Schools had the lowest mean score of 0.29. 
The score varied the most among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 2.20 
and varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.65.  
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Table 30  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Frequencies of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 0.40 0.85 [0.08, 0.70] 0.00 2.67 
PK-12 Private School 10 0.43 0.77 [-0.11, 0.98] 0.00 2.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 0.29 0.65 [-0.04, 0.63] 0.00 1.67 
Public College/University 20 2.27 2.20 [1.23, 3.29] 0.00 5.00 
Private College/University 15 3.24 2.08 [2.09, 4.39] 0.00 5.00 
Total 93 1.24 1.84 [0.86, 1.62] 0.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the frequencies of 
implementation of high-frequency critical practices among institutional types (see Table 31). The 
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of 
institutions with respect to the frequencies of implementation of high-frequency critical practices 
at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 14.73, p = 0.00]. 
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Table 31  
 
ANOVA: Frequencies of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 125.05 4 31.26 14.73 0.00 
Within Groups 186.76 88 2.12   
Total 311.81 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their frequencies of implementation of high-
frequency critical practices (see Table 32). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities 
showed statistically significant differences from PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools 
and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively. In addition, Public Colleges/Universities showed 
statistically significant differences from PK-12 Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools and PK-
12 Virtual Schools respectively. 
 
  
 105 
Table 32  
 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of High Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.04 0.53 1.00 [-1.51, 1.44] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.10 0.44 1.00 [-1.12, 1.32] 
Public College/University -1.87 0.42 0.00 [-3.03, -0.70] 
Private College/University -2.85 0.46 0.00 [-4.12, -1.57] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.04 0.53 1.00 [-1.44, 1.51] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.14 0.58 1.00 [-1.47, 1.75] 
Public College/University -1.83 0.56 0.01 [-3.40, -0.26] 
Private College/University -2.81 0.59 0.00 [-4.46, -1.15] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.10 0.44 1.00 [-1.32, 1.12] 
PK-12 Private School -0.14 0.58 1.00 [-1.75, 1.47] 
Public College/University -1.97 0.48 0.00 [-3.31, -0.63] 
Private College/University -2.95 0.52 0.00 [-4.38, -1.51] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 1.87 0.42 0.00 [0.70, 3.03] 
PK-12 Private School 1.83 0.56 0.01 [0.26, 3.40] 
PK-12 Virtual School 1.97 0.48 0.00 [0.63, 3.31] 
Private College/University -0.98 0.50 0.29 [-2.36, 0.40] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 2.85 0.46 0.00 [1.57, 4.12] 
PK-12 Private School 2.81 0.59 0.00 [1.15, 4.46] 
PK-12 Virtual School 2.95 0.52 0.00 [1.51, 4.38] 
Public College/University 0.98 0.50 0.29 [-0.4, 2.36] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
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Research Question 2.7. Low Frequency Practices 
What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of low-frequency critical 
practices among the different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 33. The respondents indicated the 
frequencies with which they performed critical security practices and reviewed security related 
policies and procedures. For practices that were typically performed once a year or less, the 
responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least frequent and 5 being the most 
frequent. The mean score for low frequency practices across all types of educational institutions 
was 1.10. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean score of 1.60, and PK-12 Virtual 
Schools had the lowest mean score of 0.74. The score varied the most among PK-12 Public 
Schools with a standard deviation of 0.68 and varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with 
a standard deviation of 0.43.  
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Table 33  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Frequencies of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 0.83 0.68 [0.58, 1.08] 0.00 2.25 
PK-12 Private School 10 1.15 0.54 [0.76, 1.53] 0.13 2.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 0.74 0.43 [0.51, 0.95] 0.00 1.38 
Public College/University 20 1.44 0.53 [1.19, 1.69] 0.25 2.13 
Private College/University 15 1.60 0.44 [1.35, 1.84] 0.75 2.13 
Total 93 1.10 0.65 [0.97, 1.23] 0.00 2.25 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the frequencies of 
implementation of low-frequency critical practices among institutional types (see Table 34). The 
results from the analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of 
institutions with respect to the frequencies of implementation of low-frequency critical practices 
at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 8.44, p = 0.00]. 
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Table 34  
 
ANOVA: Frequencies of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 10.63 4 2.66 8.44 0.00 
Within Groups 27.70 88 0.32   
Total 38.32 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their frequencies of implementation of low-
frequency critical practices (see Table 35). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities 
showed statistically significant differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual 
Schools respectively. In addition, Public Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant 
differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively. 
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Table 35  
 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Low Frequency Practices by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.32 0.20 0.53 [-0.88, 0.25] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.10 0.17 0.98 [-0.37, 0.56] 
Public College/University -0.61 0.16 0.00 [-1.06, -0.16] 
Private College/University -0.77 0.18 0.00 [-1.25, -0.27] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.32 0.20 0.53 [-0.25, 0.88] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.41 0.22 0.35 [-0.2, 1.03] 
Public College/University -0.29 0.22 0.66 [-0.89, 0.31] 
Private College/University -0.45 0.23 0.29 [-1.08, 0.18] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School -0.10 0.17 0.98 [-0.56, 0.37] 
PK-12 Private School -0.41 0.22 0.35 [-1.03, 0.2] 
Public College/University -0.71 0.19 0.00 [-1.22, -0.19] 
Private College/University -0.86 0.20 0.00 [-1.41, -0.31] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.61 0.16 0.00 [0.16, 1.06] 
PK-12 Private School 0.29 0.22 0.66 [-0.31, 0.89] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.71 0.19 0.00 [0.19, 1.22] 
Private College/University -0.16 0.19 0.93 [-0.68, 0.37] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.77 0.18 0.00 [0.27, 1.25] 
PK-12 Private School 0.45 0.23 0.29 [-0.18, 1.08] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.86 0.20 0.00 [0.31, 1.41] 
Public College/University 0.16 0.19 0.93 [-0.37, 0.68] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
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Research Question 2.8. Budget Allocations 
What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to information security among the 
different types of educational institutions? 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 36. The respondents indicated on the 
ISPI© the allocations for their institutional budgets for information technology with a focus on 
information security. The responses were scored on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the lowest budget 
allocation and 5 being the highest budget allocation. The mean score for budget allocations 
across all types of educational institutions was 1.44. Private Colleges/Universities had the 
highest mean score of 2.1l, and PK-12 Public Schools had the lowest mean score of 1.10. The 
score varied the most among Public Colleges/Universities with a standard deviation of 0.64 and 
varied the least among PK-12 Virtual Schools with a standard deviation of 0.42.  
 
Table 36  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Budget Allocation by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 1.10 0.29 [0.99, 1.20] 0.67 2.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 1.30 0.43 [0.99, 1.60] 1.00 2.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 1.29 0.42 [1.07, 1.51] 1.00 2.00 
Public College/University 20 1.67 0.64 [1.36, 1.96] 1.00 2.67 
Private College/University 15 2.11 0.59 [1.78, 2.43] 1.00 3.00 
Total 93 1.44 0.59 [1.32, 1.56] 0.67 3.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the budgetary allocation 
related to information security among institutional types (see Table 37). The results from the 
analysis revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions with 
respect to the budgetary allocation related to information security at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 
13.46, p = 0.00]. 
 
Table 37  
 
ANOVA: Perceptions of Budget Allocation by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 11.99 4 3.00 13.46 0.00 
Within Groups 19.60 88    
Total 31.59 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their budget allocations (see Table 38). Based on 
the results, Private Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant differences with PK-12 
Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively. In addition, 
Public Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant differences with PK-12 Public 
Schools. 
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Table 38  
 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Budget Allocation by Institution Type 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.20 0.17 0.76 [-0.68, 0.27] 
PK-12 Virtual School -0.20 0.14 0.64 [-0.59, 0.19] 
Public College/University -0.57 0.14 0.00 [-0.94, -0.19] 
Private College/University -1.01 0.15 0.00 [-1.42, -0.60] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.20 0.17 0.76 [-0.27, 0.68] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.01 0.19 1.00 [-0.51, 0.52] 
Public College/University -0.37 0.18 0.27 [-0.87, 0.14] 
Private College/University -0.81 0.19 0.00 [-1.34, -0.27] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School 0.20 0.14 0.64 [-0.19, 0.59] 
PK-12 Private School -0.01 0.19 1.00 [-0.52, 0.51] 
Public College/University -0.37 0.16 0.13 [-0.80, 0.06] 
Private College/University -0.82 0.17 0.00 [-1.28, -0.35] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.57 0.14 0.00 [0.19, 0.94] 
PK-12 Private School 0.37 0.18 0.27 [-0.14, 0.87] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.37 0.16 0.13 [-0.06, 0.80] 
Private College/University -0.44 0.16 0.05 [-0.89, 0.00] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 1.01 0.15 0.00 [0.60, 1.42] 
PK-12 Private School 0.81 0.19 0.00 [0.27, 1.34] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.82 0.17 0.00 [0.35, 1.28] 
Public College/University 0.44 0.16 0.05 [0.00, 0.89] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
Research Question 3 
What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational institutions with 
respect to information security, and how do results vary across the types of institutions? 
 Descriptive statistics were used to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of 
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall security 
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preparedness scores across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable 
was the self-reported information security preparedness level and the independent variable was 
the institution type. 
The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 39. The respondents rated their overall 
security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most 
prepared. The mean preparedness score across all types of educational institutions was 2.60. 
Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean preparedness score of 3.40 and PK-12 Public 
Schools had the lowest mean preparedness score of 2.16. The risk score varied the most among 
PK-12 Public Schools with a standard deviation of 1.07 and varied the least among PK-12 
Private Schools with a standard deviation of 0.67.  
 
Table 39  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Perceptions of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type 
Institution Type N Mean SD 95% CI Min Max 
PK-12 Public School 31 2.16 1.07 [1.76, 2.55] 1.00 5.00 
PK-12 Private School 10 3.00 0.67 [2.52, 3.47] 2.00 4.00 
PK-12 Virtual School 17 2.29 1.05 [1.75, 2.83] 1.00 4.00 
Public College/University 20 2.75 0.85 [2.35, 3.14] 1.00 4.00 
Private College/University 15 3.40 0.74 [2.99, 3.8] 2.00 4.00 
Total 93 2.60 1.02 [2.39, 2.81] 1.00 5.00 
 
Note. N = Number of Participants; SD = Standard Deviation; CI = Confidence Interval 
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A one-way ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in the overall self-reported 
level of preparedness among institutional types (see Table 40). The results from the analysis 
revealed that there were significant differences among the types of institutions with respect to 
their overall self-reported level of preparedness at the p < 0.05 level [F(4, 88) = 5.48, p = 0.00]. 
 
Table 40 ANOVA: Perceptions of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type 
Source SS Df MS F Sig. 
Between Groups 19.21 4 4.80 5.48 0.00 
Within Groups 77.07 88 0.88   
Total 96.28 92    
 
Note. SS = sum of squares; df = degrees of freedom; MS = mean square 
 
 
 
A Tukey HSD post hoc test was performed to determine which specific pairs of groups 
showed statistically significant differences in their overall self-reported preparedness (see Table 
41). Based on the results, Private Colleges/Universities showed statistically significant 
differences with PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools respectively.  
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Table 41  
 
Tukey HSD Post-Hoc Test of Scores of Overall Security Preparedness by Institution Type 
 
Type of Educational Institution MD SE Sig 95% CI 
PK-12 Public School PK-12 Private School -0.84 0.34 0.11 [-1.78, 0.10] 
PK-12 Virtual School -0.13 0.28 0.99 [-0.91, 0.65] 
Public College/University -0.59 0.27 0.19 [-1.33, 0.15] 
Private College/University -1.24 0.29 0.00 [-2.05, -0.41] 
      
PK-12 Private School PK-12 Public School 0.84 0.34 0.11 [-0.10, 1.78] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.71 0.37 0.33 [-0.33, 1.74] 
Public College/University 0.25 0.36 0.96 [-0.75, 1.25] 
Private College/University -0.40 0.38 0.83 [-1.46, 0.66] 
      
PK-12 Virtual School PK-12 Public School 0.13 0.28 0.99 [-0.65, 0.91] 
PK-12 Private School -0.71 0.37 0.33 [-1.74, 0.33] 
Public College/University -0.46 0.31 0.58 [-1.31, 0.40] 
Private College/University -1.11 0.33 0.01 [-2.02, -0.18] 
      
Public 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 0.59 0.27 0.19 [-0.15, 1.33] 
PK-12 Private School -0.25 0.36 0.96 [-1.25, 0.75] 
PK-12 Virtual School 0.46 0.31 0.58 [-0.4, 1.31] 
Private College/University -0.65 0.32 0.26 [-1.54, 0.24] 
      
Private 
College/University 
PK-12 Public School 1.25 0.29 0.00 [0.41, 2.05] 
PK-12 Private School 0.40 0.38 0.83 [-0.66, 1.46] 
PK-12 Virtual School 1.11 0.33 0.01 [0.18, 2.02] 
Public College/University 0.65 0.32 0.26 [-0.24, 1.54] 
 
Note. MD = mean difference; SE = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
 
  
 116 
Ancillary Analyses 
 Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze the initial findings related to the 
research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study. 
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a N/A response analysis. 
Correlation with Overall Preparedness 
 A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI© 
to investigate how the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution that 
participated in the survey correlated with the mean scores calculated for 25 security threat risk 
perception factors, 22 threat prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, 11 key security 
practice frequencies, and 3 budget allocation factors respectively. The results are summarized in 
Table 42. All the correlations were statistically significant at 0.01 level except for People-
Oriented Threats and Software-Oriented Measures which were significant only at the 0.05 level. 
All the security threat risk perception scores showed a negative correlation with overall 
preparedness scores, while prevention measure effectiveness perception scores, frequency of key 
security practices, and budget allocations showed a positive correlation with overall preparedness 
scores. In other words, higher overall preparedness scores were associated with lower security 
threat risk perception scores. Similarly, higher overall preparedness scores were associated with 
higher prevention measure effectiveness scores, higher frequency of key security practices, and 
higher budget allocations. 
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Table 42  
 
Correlation with Overall Preparedness 
Item 
Correlation 
Coefficient Sig. 
Hardware-Oriented Threats -0.29 0.004 
Software-Oriented Threats -0.29 0.005 
Data-Oriented Threats -0.28 0.008 
People-Oriented Threats -0.22 0.031 
Procedure-Oriented Threats -0.28 0.008 
Hardware-Oriented Measures 0.39 0.000 
Software-Oriented Measures 0.25 0.014 
Data-Oriented Measures 0.40 0.000 
People-Oriented Measures 0.40 0.000 
Procedure-Oriented Measures 0.40 0.000 
High Frequency Practices 0.57 0.000 
Low Frequency Practices 0.73 0.000 
Budget Allocations 0.68 0.000 
 
Note. All correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
 
 
Analysis of N/A responses 
 Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it 
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score, 
frequency of a key security measure, or a budget allocation item. The N/A response meant that 
the item did not apply to the institution concerned. An analysis was completed to find out which 
items on the ISPI© had the most N/A responses. Table 43 lists the 10 items that had the most 
N/A responses and shows the percentage distribution of each N/A response across the different 
types of educational institutions. An analysis of the items identified as having the most N/A 
responses revealed that all these items were key security measures. An average of the percentage 
distributions for each type of educational institution is provided at the end of the table. PK-12 
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Public Schools had the highest percentage of N/A responses followed closely by PK-12 Virtual 
Schools. Private Colleges/Universities had the least percentage of N/A responses. 
 
Table 43  
 
Analysis of Not Applicable (N/A) responses 
Item N 
PK-12 
Public 
Schools 
PK-12 
Private 
Schools 
PK-12 
Virtual 
Schools 
Public 
College/
Univ. 
Private 
College
/Univ. All 
Honey pot experiments 76 97% 100% 100% 65% 40% 82% 
Social engineering 
experiments to enforce 
security protocols 
71 94% 90% 100% 55% 33% 76% 
Using biometric 
authentication for accessing 
secure areas 
70 90% 80% 76% 75% 40% 75% 
Log review and monitoring 56 81% 70% 82% 40% 13% 60% 
Sending information 
technology personnel to 
attend information security 
classes 
55 74% 60% 88% 40% 20% 59% 
Using multi-factor 
authentication 
49 74% 60% 59% 35% 20% 53% 
Internal security audit 48 61% 40% 82% 35% 27% 52% 
Mandatory training on 
security topics for all 
employees 
47 65% 70% 71% 25% 20% 51% 
Review of data breach 
remediation procedures 
46 71% 60% 59% 25% 20% 49% 
Employing a dedicated 
Information Security 
Officer 
38 71% 40% 41% 20% 7% 41% 
Average  78% 67% 76% 42% 24% 60% 
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Summary 
 The results of the data analysis for each research question were presented in this chapter 
along with applicable descriptive statistics. For Research Question 1, using separate ANOVA 
analyses for each of the security risk categories, the researcher found no statistically significant 
differences between the types of educational institutions in their assessments of security risks. 
For Research Question 2, using separate ANOVA analyses, the researcher found significant 
differences between the types of educational institutions in their perceptions of the effectiveness 
of security measures, frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget 
allocations. Using post-hoc analyses, these differences were isolated to the types of educational 
institutions involved. Finally, for Research Question 3, using an ANOVA analysis, the researcher 
found that the educational institutions showed statistically significant differences in terms of 
their overall assessment of their security preparedness. Using post-hoc analyses, these 
differences were isolated to the types of educational institutions involved. A separate analysis 
revealed correlations between the overall preparedness of the educational institutions with their 
assessments of security risks, their perceptions of the effectiveness of security measures, 
frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget allocations. Finally, an 
analysis of the not applicable (N/A) responses indicated a distribution of the critical security 
measures that were not being implemented by the educational institutions. A summary of the 
study, discussion, and recommendations are presented in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, the results of the data analyses were presented. This chapter 
includes a summary of the study and a five-part discussion of findings: (a) Research Question 1 
which includes assessments of the different security risks by the different types of educational 
institutions, (b) Research Question 2 which includes perceptions of the effectiveness of security 
measures, frequencies of key security practices and policy updates, and budget allocations by the 
different types of educational institutions, (c) Research Question 3 which includes an overall 
assessment of security preparedness by the different types of educational institutions, (d) 
additional findings from supplementary analyses, and (e) an overall summary of findings from 
the discussion. Implications for practice and recommendations for further research are also 
included. 
Summary of the Study 
 The purpose of this exploratory study was to analyze the preparedness of educational 
institutions toward ensuring the security of their data by comparing their self-reported 
perceptions of security risks and their assessments of the corresponding risk-mitigating practices. 
The five different types of educational institutions that were included in this study were PK-12 
Public Schools, PK-12 Private Schools, PK-12 Virtual Schools, Public Colleges/Universities, 
and Private Colleges/Universities in the state of Florida. Factors that were studied with reference 
to securing institutional data were aligned with the five components of any information system 
(Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data, procedures, and people. The researcher 
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examined the security threats associated with these factors and explored the critical measures 
with respect to the factors that can enhance security within the constraints applicable to 
educational institutions. Given the dynamic nature of the threats to information security, the 
researcher further explored the frequencies with which the different types of educational 
institutions undertake critical security practices and stay up-to-date with their information 
security policies and procedures. Finally, the culture of educational institutions with respect to 
implementing information security measures, as reflected in their allocation of budgets for the 
same, was explored. 
 Data for this study were collected using an instrument created by the researcher 
exclusively for this study. This questionnaire-based instrument, the Information Security 
Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©), was distributed using the survey tool Qualtrix and was used to 
measure the preparedness of educational institutions to ensure the security of their institutional 
information. The questionnaire primarily focused on four institution specific areas that reflected 
institutional preparedness to counter security threats (i.e., threat identification, threat mitigation 
practices, frequency of key security practices and updates of established security policies and 
practices, and budgetary allocations to enable security measures). The questions pertaining to 
these areas were further classified according to the five components of information systems – 
hardware, software, data, people, and procedures (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015). Emails containing a 
link to the questionnaire were sent on March 7, 2018 to individuals overseeing information 
security at 218 educational institutions in the state of Florida. A total of 20 PK-12 Private 
Schools, 30 Public Colleges or Universities, 30 Private Colleges or Universities, the Florida 
Virtual School, 70 PK-12 Virtual Schools, and all 67 PK-12 Public School districts were 
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included. The survey remained open through March 31, 2018. A total of 93 responses (42.66% 
response rate) were received of which 31 were from PK-12 Public Schools, 10 were from PK-12 
Private Schools, 17 were from PK-12 Virtual Schools, 20 were from Public Colleges or 
Universities and 15 were from Private Colleges or Universities. 
The following research questions were used to guide this study: 
1. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security 
among educational institutions with respect to identification and classification 
of threats, and how do results vary across the types of institutions?  
This question was further divided into five sub-questions based on the five 
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): 
1.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
hardware-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
software-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
data-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
1.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
procedure-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
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1.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of security risks for 
people-oriented threats among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
2. What is the level of preparedness to counter threats to information security 
among educational institutions with respect to institutional safeguards, 
frequency of critical measures and security policy updates, and budgetary 
allocation, and how do results vary across the types of institutions? 
This question was further divided into eight sub-questions based on the five 
factors of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015), frequency of critical 
measures and security policy updates, and budgetary allocation: 
2.1. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
hardware-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.2. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
software-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.3. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
data-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.4. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
procedure-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
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2.5. What differences (if any) exist in the perception of the effectiveness of 
people-oriented security measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.6. What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of 
high-frequency critical measures among the different types of 
educational institutions? 
2.7. What differences (if any) exist in the frequencies of implementation of 
low-frequency critical measures and security policy updates among the 
different types of educational institutions? 
2.8. What differences (if any) exist in budgetary allocation related to 
information security among the different types of educational 
institutions? 
3. What is the overall self-reported level of preparedness among educational 
institutions with respect to information security, and how do results vary 
across the types of institutions? 
To answer Research Question 1, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the security risks associated with all recognized threats on a scale 
of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. The data obtained for the threats were aggregated to 
the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and 
procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items within each of the five-
factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were grouped together (i.e., the 
group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the 
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different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a combination of descriptive 
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level and thereafter at the type of 
institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were conducted to compare threat 
perceptions across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were 
the threats aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, 
data, people, and procedures) and the independent variable was the institution type.  
To answer Research Question 2, the respondents were asked to provide on the ISPI© 
instrument their perceptions of the effectiveness of recognized security threat prevention 
measures on a scale of 1-5 as they applied to their institutions. Thereafter, they were asked to 
indicate on the ISPI© instrument the time intervals at which their respective institutions review 
and update their specific security policies. Finally, the focus shifted to ascertaining the 
institutional cultures in acknowledging the threats to data and implementing measures to prevent 
breaches. Respondents were asked to answer questions on the ISPI© instrument about their 
institutional allocation of operational and personnel budgetary funds, and the reporting lines of 
the head of information technology for this purpose. The data obtained for the threat prevention 
measures were aggregated to the level of the five factors of information systems: hardware, 
software, data, people, and procedures (i.e., the group mean was calculated for individual items 
within each of the five factor groups). Thereafter, responses from similar institutions were 
grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated for each item by institution type) to obtain 
response profiles for the different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was a 
combination of descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the factor-level 
and thereafter at the type of institution level. Five separate one-way ANOVA procedures were 
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conducted to compare threat prevention measures across the different types of educational 
institutions. The dependent variables were the threat prevention measures aggregated to the level 
of the five factors of information systems (hardware, software, data, people, and procedures), and 
the independent variable was the institution type. The responses about frequencies of key 
security measures and security policy updates were analyzed using descriptive statistics to 
ascertain the overall response profiles at the institutional level. Two separate ANOVA 
procedures were conducted to compare the frequencies of key security measures across the 
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variables were the frequencies of key 
security measures and the independent variable was the institution type. Finally, the responses 
obtained from similar institutions for the budget allocation percentages were grouped together 
(i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type) to obtain response profiles for the 
different types of institutions. The analysis of the data collected was completed using descriptive 
statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of institution level. An ANOVA 
procedure was conducted to compare budget allocations for information security across the 
different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the budget allocations, 
and the independent variable was the institution type.  
To answer Research Question 3, the respondents were asked to rank their overall 
information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5. The responses obtained from similar 
institutions were grouped together (i.e., the group mean was calculated by institution type to 
obtain response profiles for the different types of institutions). The analysis of the data collected 
was performed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the overall response profiles at the type of 
institution level. An ANOVA procedure was conducted to compare the overall threat preparation 
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index across the different types of educational institutions. The dependent variable was the self-
reported information security preparedness level, and the independent variable was the institution 
type.  
Additional analyses were conducted to further analyze findings from the data analyses for 
the research questions and to establish identifiable patterns, if any, within the scope of the study. 
These analyses included a correlation analysis and a not applicable (N/A) response analysis. 
The correlation analysis was conducted using the responses obtained in the ISPI© to 
investigate how each of the mean scores of security threat risk perception factors, threat 
prevention measure effectiveness perception factors, frequency of key security practices, and 
budget allocations correlated with the overall preparedness scores for each educational institution 
that participated in the survey. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate which of the 
factors had the most impact on the overall institutional threat preparedness. 
 Respondents to the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey, be it 
a security threat risk perception score, threat prevention measure effectiveness perception score, 
or a frequency of a key security measure. A not applicable (N/A) response meant that the item 
concerned did not apply to the institution concerned. In other words, the institution concerned 
did not implement the item as a threat prevention measure or did not consider the item as a 
significant risk. An analysis was performed to identify the 10 items on the ISPI© that had the 
most N/A responses and how such N/A responses were distributed across the different types of 
educational institutions. The averages of the percentage distributions of the identified N/A 
response items were then calculated for each type of educational institution. The purpose of this 
analysis was to help identify how the N/A responses were distributed across the types of 
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educational institutions which, in turn, assisted in the identification of the types of educational 
institutions that were most frequently failing to implement key security measures. 
Discussion of the Findings 
Research Question 1 
 The respondents rated their perceptions of security risks for threats on a scale of 1-5 on 
the ISPI© with 1 being the least risky and 5 being the riskiest. The responses were aggregated 
based on the five components of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, 
software, data, procedures, and people; and group means were calculated. Participants from 
Private Colleges/Universities showed the least variance in their responses. Five separate 
ANOVA tests (one for each component) revealed no statistically significant differences between 
the types of educational institutions in their assessments of security risks. Perceptions of people-
oriented threats had the highest aggregate mean of 3.80. This finding matched a finding in a prior 
study by Keller et al. (2005).  
 The findings revealed that the different types of educational institutions identified 
information security risks in similar ways. Given that the security risks identified for this survey 
were dynamic in nature, it can be inferred that at present, different educational institutions have 
similar perceptions of security threats and are keeping up with the knowledge of the continuous 
changes in the field of information security in similar ways. 
Research Question 2 
 The respondents rated their perceptions of the effectiveness of measures to counter 
security risks for threats on a scale of 1-5 on the ISPI© with 1 being the least effective and 5 
being the most effective. The responses were aggregated based on the five components of 
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information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): hardware, software, data, procedures, and 
people; and group means were calculated. Participants from Public Colleges/Universities and 
Private Colleges/Universities showed the least variance in their responses. Perceptions of the 
effectiveness of data-oriented measures had the highest mean overall effective score of 4.01. 
Four of five separate ANOVA tests (one for each component) revealed significant differences 
between the types of educational institutions in their perceptions of the effectiveness of security 
measures. The only component that did not show any significant difference between the different 
types of educational institutions was the perception of effectiveness of people-oriented measures. 
Post-hoc tests conducted on the components that showed significant differences revealed the 
source of such differences between the types of educational institutions. Private 
Colleges/Universities were involved in most of such differences.  
 The respondents included in the ISPI© the frequencies with which they performed 
critical security practices and review their security policies and procedures. In addition, the 
respondents answered questions in the ISPI© regarding their institutional budget allocations for 
information security. Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean scores for the 
frequencies of security practices and policy updates as well as for the allocation of budgets. Two 
separate ANOVA tests were run for the frequency responses (one each for low frequency 
measures and high frequency measures). An ANOVA test was run for the budgetary responses as 
well. These tests revealed significant differences between the types of educational institutions in 
their frequencies of critical security practices and review of security policies as well as in their 
budget allocations. Post-hoc tests conducted revealed the source of such differences between the 
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types of educational institutions. Private Colleges/Universities were again involved in most of 
such differences.  
 The findings revealed that the educational institutions had differences in their perceptions 
of effectiveness of their security risk mitigation practices, including the frequencies of 
occurrence.  However, the perceptions of effectiveness of people-oriented risk mitigation 
practices did not show any difference across the different types of educational institutions. 
Because these risk mitigation practices and their frequencies of operation are universal, it can be 
inferred that there could be differences in their implementation across the different types of 
educational institutions. In addition, because these measures incur an expenditure, a 
corresponding difference in the budgetary allocation scores for information security related 
activities was an expected finding. An analysis of the budgetary allocation scores did reveal such 
differences across the different educational institution types.  
 An interesting finding was that no significant difference was observed for the perception 
of effectiveness of people-oriented measures across the different educational institution types. It 
can thus be inferred that educational institutions have been undertaking security measures that 
involve people in similar ways. One possible explanation for this is the relatively lower cost of 
implementation of people-centric security practices which are primarily based on user training 
and instruction as compared to the more sophisticated and expensive measures that apply to the 
other factors (hardware, software, data, and procedures). This allows most institutions to 
implement similar user-oriented practices with similar effects in risk prevention. A possible 
counter explanation could be that institutions find people-oriented measures ineffective, 
irrespective of the cost involved, as human behaviors are the most difficult to manage and 
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predict; thus, they rate their effectiveness with similar scores which are typically low. In this 
study the mean of the people-oriented measures was 3.05, which is somewhere in the middle of 
the 1-5 range. So, the first explanation seems more plausible, but the counter explanation cannot 
be discounted. 
Research Question 3 
The respondents rated their overall information security preparedness on a scale of 1-5 on 
the ISPI© with 1 being the least prepared and 5 being the most prepared. The responses were 
aggregated based on the five components of information systems (Kroenke & Boyle, 2015): 
hardware, software, data, and procedures and people; and group means were calculated. 
Participants from PK-12 Private Schools showed the least variance in their responses, and 
Private Colleges/Universities had the highest mean preparedness score of 3.40. An ANOVA test 
that was conducted showed significant differences between the types of educational institutions 
in their perceptions of their overall information security preparedness. Post-hoc tests conducted 
revealed the source of such differences to be between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 
Public Schools and between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Virtual Schools. 
 In a review of the overall mean scores (Table 39), participants from PK-12 Public 
Schools averaged an overall preparedness score of 2.16 and those from PK-12 Virtual Schools 
averaged an overall preparedness score of 2.29. Compared to the average score of 3.40 for 
Private Colleges/Universities, the scores of PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools 
were significantly lower.  
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Ancillary Analyses Findings 
 A correlation analysis was conducted to determine how each of the security threat risk 
scores, threat prevention measure effectiveness scores, frequency of key security practices, and 
budget allocations correlated with overall preparedness scores across all educational institutions. 
The results were summarized in Table 42. All of the correlations were significant at the 0.05 
level and the 0.01 level except for those with people-oriented threats and with software-oriented 
measures which were significant only at the 0.05 level. All the security threat risk scores showed 
a negative correlation with overall preparedness scores, but prevention measure effectiveness 
scores, frequency of key security practices, and budget allocations showed a positive correlation 
with overall preparedness scores. In other words, higher overall preparedness scores were 
correlated with lower security threat risk scores. Similarly, higher overall preparedness scores 
were correlated with higher prevention measure effectiveness scores, higher frequency of key 
security practices, and higher budget allocations. The strongest correlations were observed for 
the overall preparedness score with Low Frequency Practices, Budget Allocations and High 
Frequency Practices (correlation coefficients of 0.73, 0.68 and 0.57 respectively). On further 
review of the post-hoc tests done after the ANOVA tests for Low Frequency Practices, Budget 
Allocations and High Frequency Practices, it was observed that significant differences existed 
between Private Colleges/Universities and PK-12 Private Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools 
respectively. Thus, it can be inferred that frequency of security practices and budget allocations 
are the strongest contributors to the overall preparedness score for an institution. 
 Respondents of the ISPI© had the option to indicate N/A for any item on the survey be it 
a security threat risk score, threat prevention measure effectiveness score, or a frequency of a key 
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security measure. The N/A response meant that item did not apply to the institution concerned. 
An analysis was completed to identify which items on the ISPI© had the most N/A responses. 
Table 43 lists the 10 items that had the most N/A responses and shows the percentage 
distribution of each type of educational institution that responded with an N/A response. All 
these items are key security measures. PK-12 Public Schools had the highest percentage of N/A 
responses followed closely by PK-12 Virtual Schools. Private Colleges/Universities had the least 
percentage of N/A responses. 
 Thus, it can be observed that PK-12 Public Schools and PK-12 Virtual Schools were not 
conducting a significant number of key security measures. It can be inferred from this finding 
that these institutions were having to deal with a lack of adequate personnel or expertise to 
perform these key security procedures which in turn can be associated with a smaller budget 
allocation. This finding confirms the earlier finding of frequency of security practices and budget 
allocations to be the strongest contributors to the overall preparedness score for an institution. 
 
Implications for Practice 
 This researcher grouped responses about threat perceptions, security measures and 
overall preparedness by the type of institution and analyzed them based on the five factors of 
information systems: hardware, software, data, people, and procedures. These metrics show the 
differences in self-reported security preparedness among the types of institutions. Educational 
institutions are always in the process of balancing the conflicting demands of open culture, 
convenience of users and information security. In addition, there are other implications for the 
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information security environment of an educational institution. Personnel, employee 
certification, and outsourcing security pose constraints in the discussion of implications. 
The presence of a dedicated information security department can make a substantial 
difference in terms of an educational institution’s security policies and procedures. The number 
of employees dedicated to implement and manage information security also speaks to the 
importance of security issues. Some of these employees often have duties assigned to them other 
than information security. Medium to small institutions often have only one person, and 
sometimes in a part-time capacity, taking on the information security duties. 
The security certification of the employee(s) in charge of security is a significant factor. 
Given the salaries certified professionals are presently enjoying, most schools and smaller 
colleges find it difficult to be competitive, and most of the educational institutions often try to 
grow the person from within. When institutions do take the time to train information security 
staff, they are very likely to be hired away from them. 
To offset the lack of personnel or lack of expertise in the areas of information security, 
some institutions (especially smaller ones) may consider security as a service, essentially 
outsourcing the security management responsibilities to an outside company. This may prove to 
be a cost-effective solution for some institutions. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
This exploratory study concentrated on self-reported preparedness of educational 
institutions. Because such institutions are always in the process of balancing the contrasting 
requirements of culture, convenience and security, such responses may only reflect what they 
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feel they are doing right. Gaps may still exist in their actual security preparedness and what they 
perceive it to be.  
Student population size is an important factor in information security in educational 
institutions because it often directly affects the institution’s budget allocation. In other words, the 
smaller the institution, the fewer resources it typically has to allocate towards information 
security initiatives. This study did not differentiate the selected educational institutions in terms 
of this factor. A future study may be considered where institutions may be differentiated in terms 
of student population size. For example, small (0-15,000), medium (15001-60,000) and large 
(60,001 and above). 
This study focused on a cross-section of educational institutions in the state of Florida. 
To study far-reaching trends and eliminate any regional or state-wide bias, a future study may 
need to be conducted that would include responses from educational institutions nationwide. 
Future research may also include a design of an "information security matrix" which 
dynamically assigns weights to threats and measures based on their severity and prevalence with 
time. This matrix may then evaluate the preparedness of each institution by comparing their 
measures with established standards dynamically and making necessary adjustments based on 
budgets, school-size, profile and other parameters. The output from this matrix-based process 
would be a score that will reflect the actual preparedness of each institution. This could 
potentially be designed along the lines of the framework used by the corporate credit-rating 
agencies like Moody’s Investor Service, Standard & Poor, and Fitch Ratings, that evaluate 
investment products like bonds and by individual credit-rating agencies like Experian, Equifax 
and Trans Union, that evaluate credit scores of individuals on pre-set parameters. To ensure 
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compliance, such a matrix-based security preparedness evaluation tool may be maintained at the 
state-level and be used to evaluate the information security performance of each institution on an 
annual basis. 
Summary 
 This exploratory study was an attempt to find any significant differences in the 
information security preparedness among different types of educational institutions. The 
researcher found that though institutions differed in terms of their perceptions of effectiveness of 
security measures, frequencies of security operations and policy reviews, and budgetary 
allocations, they had very similar understandings of the risks associated with the security threats. 
This study was conducted to analyze the security practice gaps that were revealed, to identify 
potential causes and explore options by which gaps may be bridged.  
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 The Information Security Preparedness Instrument (ISPI©) used in this study was 
checked for reliability and consistency using Chronbach’s Alpha. The results are as follows: 
 
Reliability Statistics for ISPI© 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.767 .788 14 
 
 The Reliability Statistics shows the value of the Chronbach’s Alpha coefficient. If the 
coefficient is above 0.70, the instrument has high internal consistency. In this case the coefficient 
was 0.767 which shows that the ISPI© had high internal consistency and was thus reliable. 
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